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Draft Recommendation
on defence and securitl,in an enlarged Europe
The Assembly,
(t) Welcomrng thc decrsrons of the North Atlantic Council rn Berlur on 3 June 1996 as rcgards the
development of the European sccunty and defencc idcntih' (ESDI) rvluch should lead to the creatron of a
visible and lrable European capabrhS'to assume responsrbilrtres ns-a-ns the sccunW nsks Europe rs facrng;
(ti) Considering that the development of the ESDI rvrthrn NATO can onlv be successful if the
Atlantrc Alliance. m close cooperation r,r'ith WEU. is able to rmplement thc combmed lornt task force
(CJTF) concept as rndicated rn the Berhn communrque and in accordance with the guidchnes lard down
b1'the Defence Mrnisters of the North Atlantrc Councrl at their meetmg in Brussels on l3 June 1996;
Art) Au'are that development of the ESDI urthin NATO and rmplementation of the CJTF concept are
closell' linked rvrth the reform of NATO's command structures for uhich preparatlons are norv bemg
made m the Long-Term Studl'produced bv NATO's Mrlitan'Committee:
(O Considcring that NATO's future military command structure should ensure military effectiveness.
preserve the transatlantrc link and feature a hrgh degree of visibilrty wrth regard to the European
securitl' and defence identrtr'.
(t) Recognrsmg that, r.rithrn NATO, the ESDI s'rll be estabhshed through the identification of assets
and capabilrtrcs. the plannrng and exercising of forces and the definition of European command
arrangements for WEU-led operatrons.
(w) Considerrng that WEU urll nou' have to clarr!' the prrnciples and arrangements for the
particrpation of other European alhes. u'ho are not full members of WEU, m every stage of WEU-led
European operatrons makrng use of NATO assets and capabilitres, including therr preparalon and
execution.
(wr) Welcoming the fact that WEU rs actrvelf involved in the implementation of the CJTF concept and
that illustratrve profilcs of hkely types of WEUJed operatrons havc alreadr,'bcen presented to NATO;
(wr) Taking account of the fact that the NATO cnlargement process could seriousll' hamper
ratification of the START II Treatl' b1' the Russian State Duma and lead to Russran requests for
fundamental changes rn the Treatv on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE),
(x) Considerrng that. as a conscquence of rts developmcnt lvrthin NATO. Europe's securitr,' and
defence identitv u'ill be fullr' dependent on the North Atlantic Councrl. rvhrch rvill not only, have to
approve the release of NATO assets and capabilrties for WEUJed operatrons but ri,ill also monitor their
use and keep rt under revicu. rvith this rncluding thc rrght to recall such assets in order for NATO to be
ablc to perform its oun tradrtronal and nerv missrons:
(x) Consrdering that in the North Atlantrc Council both the decrsion to approve thc release of NATO
assets and capabrlrtres for WEU-led operatrons and the decisron to recall such assets rvill have to be
unanlmous in vieu' of their vrtal importance for the success of EuropeanJed operations.
(n) Convinced that in vieu, of developments in the estabhshment of a European security architecture.
thc definrtron of a European securitl' and defence identitl' and the process to cnlarge NATO. the EU and
WEU. there is a need to reviex' the WEU Maastricht Declaration of l0 December l99l in order to
propose more tmaginattve soluttons for securttl, arrangements involving European non-NATO member
states,
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(xii) Considering that the possrbrlity of abandoning NATO membership as a condition for granting
WEU membership merits special attention even though it is desrrable for membershrp of both
organisations to coincide;
(xnr) Considering that any enlargement of NATO rvhich is supposed to enhance securitv in Europe can
only be the result of a thorough process of negotiation and dialogue, not only with candrdates for earlv
membership but also wrth all other European non-NATO member states rvhrch have an intcrest rn
safeguarding security and stability in Europe;
(xiv) Emphasrsrng that NATO enlargement should in no rvav be rushed through m order to make the
5Oth anniversary celebratrons of thc Atlantic Alliance in 1999 a more triumphant occasion;
(*) Notrng that earll'NATO enlargement to take in only a feu' selcct ccntral European countries,
rvithout pa)'mg careful attentron to the securrty requirements of other central European countnes. could
provide more secunty' for those countries in the region rvho need rt least and create more danger for
those alrcady most at rrsk.
(rvi) Stressing that in parallel rvith a limited enlargement of NATO, satrsfactorl'arrangements must be
made wrth those countnes rvhich have asked to be admitted but which rvill not belong to the first group
of new member states;
(wu) Deploring the wholly unsatisfactorl' reply of the Council to the specrfic proposals made m
Assemblv Recommendation 585 on securitv and military cooperation in the Baltic Sea area.
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COI.INCIL
l. Pav specrfic attention to the posrtron of the Baltic states as Europe's securrtv archrtecture takes
shape b1'.
makmg plans to create a body within WEU to coordrnate and cstabhsh pnonties for mrlitarl'
assrstance offered to the Baltic states b1'WEU member. associate member and observer states;
promotrrg the estabhshment of a "Standrng Baltrc Sea Force" lrrth Denmark, Estonia, Germany,
LaMa, Lithuarua and Poland as foundrng members, whrle stipulatmg that, at a later stage. other
Baltic Sea countnes should be able to jour,
rnstructrng the WEU Planmng Cell to rutiate and coordinate the operatronal planmng of the
"Standing Baltrc Sea Force" once it rs established, beanng rn mind that the tasks of this force
should rnclude border control, morutonng of fishing and emronmental regulations, shrpprng
control, search and rescue and, at a later stage, the rmplementation of Petersberg tasks.
makrng a lourt review of thc srtuation rn the Baltic Sea area in order to identif' threats and
disorder and assess and counter them m accordance llrth generally-accepted cntena;
supporturg the estabhshment in one of the Baltrc states of a WEU Information Centre srmrlar to
the one opened in Bucharcst in November 1994, rrfuch has surce proved that rt can play a useful
role rn enhancrng knowledge and understandrng of WEU ur polrtical and acadcmrc crclcs and also
among the representatives of the medra ur that part of Europc.
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
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2. Reconsider present WEU policy as regards condilons for membership wrth a view to proposmg more
imaguntive solutions for secunty arrangements lnvohrng European non-NATO member states, rn partrcular
by examumg the possibilrty of abandoning NATO memberslup as a condrtion for grantrrg WEU membershrp
and also takrng account, with a uew to a genuure ESDI, of the advantage of congruence of membershrp rn
WEU, NATO and the European Uruon,
3. Clanfy the principles and anangements for the participation of other European allies, who are not full
members of WEU, rn every stage of WEU-led European operations making use of NATO assets and
capabilities, rncludrng therr preparation and execution;
4. Resume the dralogue wrth the Russian Federation, wtuch could be of malor urterest to both sides given
that WEU is a wholly European organisation.
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Explanatory Memorandum
(submilted by Mr Marten, Rapporteur)
I. Introdudion
l. What wrll be the future of Europe's secunty?
Since the collapse of the Berlin wall, this has been a
major, rf not the major, nsue in secuntl, and defence
drscussrons ur Europe from the Aflantrc to the
Urals. Nobody ever expected that it would be easy
to find solutions acceptable to all concemed. It
seems, however, that much progress has been made
in recent months and that at leaS the contours of a
future European secunty framework are taking
shape.
2. Under the Uruted Kingdom's presidency, the
WEU Council concentrated on efforts to make
WEU more operational. Structures were developed
to allow the quick and effectrve deployment of
forces and to ensure satisfactory systems of
command and control. Important work was done to
find ways of usrng NATO assets rather than
duplicatrng them. The Birmrngham Declaration of
May 1996 marked rmportant steps rn the nght
direction towards WEU's operational capabilrty.
3. In June 1996, NATO Forergn Ministers rrr
Berhn and Defence Muusters in Brussels made a
breakthrough rn the rmplementation of the
Combined Joint Task Force concept and in their
consensus to build a European secunty and defence
identrty wrthrn the Atlantic Alliance. Apart from
tlus, NATO continued to discuss the issue of
enlargement and its relalons wrth Russia.
4. Altogether, there are abundant reasons to
rellew the present state of affarrs in the efforts
berng made to eKend defence and secunty ur
Europe.
5. It should be noted that for the purposes of the
present report, your Rapporteur has worked in close
cooperatron with Mr Antretter, the Political
Commrttee's Rapporteur for the report entitled "The
eastem drmension of European security". As
regards the issue of enlargement, both reports are
complementary. In the present report, wluch is
partly a follow-up to the report on "Security and
mrlitary cooperation in the Baltic Sea area"r, special
attention is pard to the position of the Baltic sLates,
Poland and Russia.
II. Security and military cooperotion
in the Baltic Sea area
6. In Recommendation 585 on secunty and
military cooperation in the Baltic Sea area, adopted
on 5 December 1995, the Assembly made the
following specifi c recommendations :
"1. Make plans for creating a body wrthrn
WEU to coordinate and establish
pnorities for nulitary assistance offered
by its members, associate member and
observer states to the Baltic states;
2. Promote the establishment of a
"Standrng Baltic Sea Force" wrth
Denmark, Estorua, Germany, LaMa,
Lithuania and Poland as foundrng
members, whrle stipulatrng that, at a
later stage, other Baltic Sea countries
should be able to join;
3. Instruct the WEU Plannmg Cell to
uritiate and coordrnate the operational
planmng of the "Standrng Baltic Sea
Force", onc€ t is established, bearing in
mlnd tlnt the tasks of this force should
rrclude border control, morutonng of
fishing and environmental regulatrons,
shipping control, search and rescue, and
at a later stage the rmplementation of
Petersberg missions,
4. Make a jornt rer,rew of the situatron rr
the Baltic Sea area m order to identify
threats and disorder and to assess and
overcome them ln accordance wrth
generally-accepted critena;
5. Support the establishment of a WEU
Information Centre in one of the Baltic
states similar to the one opened in
Bucharest rn November 1994 and
which has since proved to play a useful
role in enhancurg knowledge and
understanding of WEU in politrcal and
academic circles and also among thel. Assembly Document 1494.
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reprcsentatlves of the medn m that part
ofEurope "
7 ln rts repll'. commurucatcd to the fusembll'
on 22 May 1996, thc Councrl drd not gl\'e an)'
rcaction to thesc five recommendattons.
8 On the other hand, the Councrl rrdulgcd rn a
number of rather aulan'ard generaltttes rvtuch bear
no relation uhatsoever to the spectfic recom-
mendatrons made by' the Assembly In its repll',
undcrstandably, the Councrl firstlr' "talies note of
the recommendatrons of the Parliamentary
Asscmbly' on secuntv and mrlitary cooperation ur
the Baltic Sea area. and rvelcomcs the Assemblrrs
rrterest ur the secun['of the Baltic Sea area".
9 Thcn, the Council subtly reminds the
Assembly' "that at the trme u'hen the document on a
status of assocratron rvas agreed m Luxembourg tn
Ma1' 1994, a specrfic reference rvas made in the
Krrchberg Declaration to the srtuation ur the Baltic
area". Tlus spccrfic refcrence, made rn paragraph
l2 ofthe Krrchberg Declaration of Ma1' 1994. reads
as follou's:
"Underhmng the polrtical srgruficance nluch
the urthdrau'al of forergn troops from the
territones of the Baltrc slates represents for
stabrhh' ur Europe. Muusters rnelcomed the
rec€nt Russran-Latlran agreements and
expressed thcir support for the earlv
conclusron of the talks betueen Russia and
Estorua."
One u'onders ll'hat sense rt makes to refor solemnll'
to a rathcr non-commitLal comment on a situatron
uhrch has Iong srncc been overtaken bv more recent
dcvelopmcnts.
l0 In the follou'rng paragraph of rts repll', the
Councrl refers to the Noordurlk Declaration of
November 1994, in rr'tuch rt x'elcomed "the
uithdrau'al of foreigrr troops from the Baltrc states,
*hich represents a slgruficant contribution to thc
secuntl' situatron rn the regron and enhances general
stabllry' rn Europe" The Assembly cannot but
agree urth tlls oprmon. but the event to u'hrch it
refers rs past hrston' and although rt is relel'ant, it
should also be noted that rt has b1'no means allaycd
the secunS'concems of the Baltic states
11 The Councrl then states that.
"fn paragraph 9 of the Krrchberg
Declaratron, WEU also rnstituted a proc€ss
of contacts ruth Russn so as to allow for the
development of the exstrng dralogue and of
exchanges of informatron on lssues of
common mterest These contacts comple-
ment efforts rn other fora to enhance stabrlitl'
rn Europe "
The Assembll' fully rccogruses the rmportance of
rrstitutronal contacts ruth Russn and at the trme
uelcomed ttus irutiative of the Council, but it is
au,are that rt has bome littlc fruit so far. Indeed,
Russia has tabled a number of proposals for the
development of a senous rrstitutional dialogue urth
WEU, but ufule in Russn, r'our Rapporteur was
told bv foreign affairs officials that so far WEU has
not reacted to them It rvas said that no progress
had been made and thatthe dralogue u.rth WEU u'as
at a dead end, nohrrthstandrng the recent','rsit of the
WEU SecretaryCeneral to Mostar.
12 ln the follourng paragraph of the Council's
reph'. it rs stated that.
"The states of the Baltrc regron ufuch have
become associate partners of WEU have
contnbutcd to u'ork in the Orgamsation,
notablf in the draftrng of the document
"European secun['. a comrnon concept of
thc 27 WEU countries". The Council of
Mrrustcrs has rccogrused the rnportance of
tlus cxercrse, rn promotmg a better
understandrng among the WEU member
states, assocnte members, observers and
assocnte parmers of each other's policres,
and as a first step tou'ards a contnbutron to
secuntl' and stabrlrty m Europe, ln
neighbounng areas and rn the urder world,
particularly by rntensrfl,rng polrtrcal dralogue
and enhancrng European capabrlrties rn the
field of cnsis preventron and management "
13 Thrs rs all very u'ell and the Assembll, would
ncver drcam of playng doun the mportance of ttus
erercise, but it u'ould hke to remrnd the Councrl that
now'here m the entrre document "European secunt),:
a corilnon concept of the 27 WEU countnes" rs
there any' reference to the precanous position of the
three Baltic states ur particular or even to secuntl' m
the Baltrc Sea area ur general
14. In the paragraphs that follow. the Councrl
excels rtself rn rts Delphrc rephes when rt savs.
"With regard to the adoption of specific
measures, thc Councrl would llke to remrnd
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the Parliamentan' Assembly of paragraph 2
of the document on a slatus of assocntron.
wfuch notes that associate partners mav
associate themselves wrth decisions taken bv
member states concerxng the tasks
emsaged rn paragraph II.4 of the Petersberg
Declaration, and that w'hen thev participate
ur their unplementation. "they wrll have the
same obligations as other particlpants, as
uell as the nght of urvolvement rn the
command strucfures and in thc Councrl's
subsequent decision-makrng process" "
15 The attenhon of the Assembll, is further
draun to paragraph 2l of the Madnd Declaration.
rn wfuch Ministcrs agreed that "on the basrs of thc
common ground developed m the common reflection
onthe nerl European secuntl,condrtrons and withm
the context of their present s[atus, the associatc
parhrers should be more rnvolved rr the ongoing
work on the development of the operatronal role of
WEU urth regard to Petersberg missions".
16 The Assemblf is perfectl)'a\\,are of the text
of the document on a sLatus of association and of the
text of the Madrid Declaratron It is most krnd and
almost or,er-zealous of the Council to remrnd the
fusembll' of these texts, uhose content is onlv too
rvell-knoun srnce they constrtute the basic frame-
rvork for relations betu,een WEU and assoclate
partrer states.
17 It is. on the other hand, ertremely regrettable
that apart from the rather hollorv repettron of these
uell-knoun texts that have been m exstence for
some considerable time, the Councrl crther drd not
bother or !\,as not able to reply' to the five
paragraphs in the operative texl of Recommendation
585 These recommendatrons u'ere drafted m clear
and unambrguous terms If the Councrl, for w.hat-
ever reason, does not agree xrth the proposals made
b1'the Assembly'. rt should make that clear rn rts
reply If the Councrl is not able to reply becausc it
tlmks that the timc is not npe for the imple-
mentation of such proposals, a substantiated replv
would be fully undersandable.
18. The Council's reply to Recommendatron 585
concludurg urth the paragraph.
"The Councrl considers that the evohrng
secun[, dialogue urth rts rune associate
parbrers. rncludmg those from the Baltrc area
rn WEU, contnbutes to the stabrlrty of the
regton."
has all the hallrnarks of contempt of parliament It
does not proude a srngle reply to the verv specific
proposals made. A mearungless reply. as has nou,
been given more than fil,e months after the Council
received the text of the Recommendailon. makes no
contribution at all to the debate between the Councrl
and Assemblv
19. At the end of the Brrmrngham Declaration of
7 May 1996, the Councrl "recogrused the valuable
contribution of the WEU Parhamentarv Assembh,
to the rvork of the orgarusation, and expressed
appreciation for the Assembly's rnput to the debate
on secuntv and defence m Europe".
20 If the Council is senous uhen makrng such
statements, it rvould do better to try to repll,to the
AssemblrJs recommendatrons, wluch are the mam
ingredient of its urput to the debate on secuntv and
defence rn Europe.
IIL The reform of NATO's command structures
2l . As a consequence of the manv changcs ur
Europe's pohtical and rrulrtary enr.rronment dunng
recent I'ears, the polrtrcal leadershrp of NATO
decided to adapt the orgarusatron to the neu'
circumstances Nerv missrons rvere added to the
essentnl core functrons of consultation and
collectivc defence
22 The neu'strategic concept, as agrecd at the
Rome summrt meetmg of 7 and 8 November 1991.
reaffirmed the core functions but added dralogue
and cooperatlon riith European non-NATO
members 
^ 
u ns11' fask. In addrtron. cnsls
marngemcnt includrng peacekecprng \\'as also
agreed as a ne\,\' area of activrtv for NATO.
Moreover. enhancement of the role and respon-
sibrlities of the Europcan member statcs \\'as
consrdered an rnportant basrs for the transformatron
of the Alhance.
23. The NATO sumrrut meetmg m Brussels on
l0-ll Januarv 1994 requrred NATO to adapt its
mrlrtan' structures and procedurcs to accommodate
the enlarged spectrum of Alhance rilsslons It also
endorsed the concept of combrned lornt task forces
(CJTF) to make allied assets avarlable to Europeans
for conductrng nllitary operations rn uhrch the
Uruted States did not partlclpate Furthermore. it
endorsed the Parhershrp for Peacc programme.
offcnng European non-NATO states a wrde range
of possibilitres for cooperatron wrth NATO
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Frnally, arms control, dtsarmament and counter-
prolifcratron u'erc also rrtroduced as rmportant
NATO russlons
24 In Apnl 1994. the Allnnce's Medrum-Term
Resource Plan questroned the real spendrng power
rn NATO's mrlrtarl'budget over the 1'ears ahead
25 Agarnst tlus backdrop of drmrmshing
resources on thc onc hand and the polrtrcal mandate
to adapt NATO's structures on the other. the
Mrlrtary Commrttce rrutrated u'hat camc to be
knoun as the NATO Long-Term Studl'.
26 The Mrlrtan'Commrttee's basic tdea rvas to
updatc document MC400, thc nuhtarv unple-
mcntatlon of Alliance strategl', rn order to provrde a
sohd platform from n'hrch to address the ultrmate
goal of revrexrng thc Allnnce's command structure
At rts meetng on 23 Apnl 1996. the Mrlitary
Commrttee, at Ctuefof-Staff level. adoptcd rccom-
mendatrons x'hich rvere to be examrned bv thc
North Atlantrc Councrl n Berhn m June
27 At therr me€tmg rr Bcrln on 3 June 1996,
NATO mrrusters referred to tlus studl', statrng that
they rvelcomed
"the first results of the Milrtary Commrttee's
Long-Term Studl', ufuch urll result rn
recommendations for a mrlitary command
structure better surted to current and future
Euro-Atlantrc securitr"'.
The commuruque then stated:
"We task the Mrlrtarl' Commrttee to continuc
ts u'ork on the Long-Term Studl', conststent
sith the decisrons n'e hal'e taken todat' "
28. On 13 June 1996, the Defence Mrrusters of
the North Atlantrc Councrl. as stated rr the final
commuruque of therr meetrng,
"drrected the Mrlrtary Comnuttee to contmue
its uork on the l.ong-Term Study on the
basrs of dectstons taken m Berlrr Tlus
further u'ork should also take account of the
need for a srngle. multtnatronal command
structure, respectrng the prurcrple of unity of
command, rn wfuch all natrons should have
an appropnate role. capable of per{ormrng rts
core functron of collectrve dcfence and.
through flexrble and agreed procedures. of
undertakrng ne\r' roles m the changrng
clrcumstances. takrng full advantage of the
CJTF concept: the need to Improve NATO's
effectrveness and flexbrlitl'. the conttnued
mvolvement of the North Amencan alltes
across the command and force structure. the
development, urth the particrpatron of all
European alhes. of the ESDI wrthm the
Alhancc; the need to be able to absorb
enlargement wrthout malor restructuring; and
the need for cost effecttveness Adaptations
should not bc drivcn onll' b1' sar,ngs but
everl' attempt should be madc to reducc
runrung costs. Arrangemcnts should be
del'elopcd to pror.rde for tncreased
partrcrpatron of parbrer countnes "
29. The Mrusters "rcqucsted thc Councrl rr
permancnt sesslon to prolT de ail' nec€ssary further
polrtrcal gurdance We look fonvard to spcedv
progress rn completrng thrs task and have asked the
Councrl m pcrmanent sesslon. urth the adlrce of the
NATO mrlrtarl' authorities, to make rccom-
mendatrons on thc possrble outlmes of the future
command structure and related kef issues for
decsron at our next meetrrg in December "
30. The Mrlrtary Commrttce is nou'proccedrng
on the rvorkrng assumption of tuo strategic
commands, SACEUR and SACLANT. both under
a US commander. and the retentton of the exrsturg
Canada/US Regronal Planrung Group ur a future
command structure At their most recent meetmg,
the Chrcfs of Defonce Staff decided to proceed, on
the basrs of a u'orkmg assumption. with a srngle
three-level command structure rrstead of the prcsent
four-level modcl. compnsmg tw'o strategtc com-
mands. four to sx regtonal commands and a
numbcr of sub-regronal commands. Dctarled pro-
posals for the ne\\' colnmand structure wrll be
prescnted to the Clucfs of Defence Staff at their
meetmg on 20 November for subsequent polrtical
consrderation bv Mrrusters rn December 1996
3l Detarled rssues such as internal headquarters
structures xill be considered rn phase thrce of the
Long-Term Studl', u'hrch rs schcduled to begrr rr
Januarl'1997
32. A drscussion rs strll under wa)'as to whether
there should be tuo or three reglons in Europe At
present. Europe still has three regional headquarters
AFCENT m Brunssum (the Netherlands),
AFNORTH ln flgh W1'combe (the Urutcd
Krngdom) and AFSOUTH rn Naplcs (Italy). A
malontl' rs in falour of adopturg the two-region
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model, rvhich rvould most hkelv lead to the closrng
ofAFNORTH
33. It has been agrecd that further structural
uork urll be contrnued on thc basrs of 'Jorrt
regional commands" and of a mrxfure of 'Jourt" and
"component commands" at a sub-regronal level
adapted to prescnt regional requrements.
34. It can be said that the Long-Term Studv has
made substantial progress although much remans
to be done. At the next meetmg of the Mrlrtan,
Commrttce rn Clucfs-of-Staff scssion. structural
altcmatrves will be presentcd rrfuch urll be much
leaner than the present mrlitarv command structure.
Thc future structure should ensure mrlitary cffec-
tivcness. preserve the transatlantrc hnk and feature a
tugh degree of r,rsrbrlrtv urth regard to the European
secuntv and defence rdentrtl' It $1ll also be able to
absorb enlargement and an enhanced PfP. rn the
lattcr case marnly bv applling the pnnciplc of
centrahsed planmng and decentrahscd execution
35. In pnncrple, thcre rs indced lrttlc
disagreement urmong NATO member states over the
need to strearnlme the cxstrng command structures.
Therr srze can be reduccd and a morc flexrble
orgarusation can bc estabhshcd rr order to enable
NATO to respond morc easilv to the requirements
of its neu' tasks and rrusslons The problem,
horvever, rs hou'these neu, structures are gomg to
be manned. rn particular to allou the Euro-
pearusation of NATO to take shape. and to make
the developmcnt of a European secunfi'and defence
identrh' more r.rsrble Tlus thomv rssuc rrrll be
exammed rn Chapter V of the prcsent report
IV Combined joint taskforces QJTD
36. At rts summrt meetrng rn Brussels rr Januarl'
1994. NATO cndorsed the pnncrple that collectrve
assets and capabilrtres of the Ailiance can bc made
avarlable for WEU operatrons grvcn that WEU uill
not be able to perform an1'ofthc Petersberg tasks
successfullv untrl rt has developed rts operatronal
capabrlitres. The purpose of the so-called combrncd
lornt task force (CJTF) concept u'luch u'as adopted
at that meetmg. is to provrde separable. but not
separate. nllrtary capabrlrtres that could be
emplol'ed bl' NATO or WEU. cnablng the
Europcan allics to conduct rrulitar_r' operations n the
framervork of WEU if NATO uere unablc, or
unrrrllurg, to act Srrcc the begirur:ng of 1994.
negotiations on the rmplementatron of the CJTF
concept halc bcen draggurg on for more than two
y'ears urthout an_v tangible result,
37 A real brcakthrough became possible uhen.
ur December 1995. the French Government made it
clear that under ccrtam condrtrons. France u'as
prepared to take rts place rn NATO's mrlitary
structures
38 Thc French Forcigrr Mrmster. Hen'e dc
Charettc, then declared that. from that moment on.
France would agan occupr- rts soat in NATO's
Militan' Commrttce and ur thc vanous nulrtan'
agencies u'llch depended on rt. At the samc trme.
Mr de Charctte said that the French Defcnce
Mmrster could partrcrpatc m the actrvrtres of the
Alhance on a rcgular basrs At the trme, French
sourccs noted that rt lvas too earlv to conclude that
France u'ould automatcalll'particrpate rn the half-
ycarly meetrrgs of the allied defence mmrsters m the
framcwork of the Dcfence Plaruxng Commrttee and
the Nuclear Plannrng Group.
39. Srnce then, negotntrons on rmplemcntrng the
CJTF concept have accelerated. At the mrmstenal
meetmg of the North Atlantrc Councrl rn Bcrhn on 3
June 1996. mrnistcrs u-elcomed the progress
actuevcd rn negotiatrons on the CJTF concept.
They stated that:
"B1' permrtturg a more flexrble and mobilc
deplolment of forces. rncludrng for nerv
missrons. this concept urll facrlitate the
mountmg of NATO contmgencl' opcratrons,
the use of separablc but not separate milrtarl'
capabrlitres m operatrons led b1' WEU. and
the partrcipation of natrons outsrde the
Alhance rn operatrons such as IFOR We
nou'rcquest the Milrtan'Commrttcc to make
recommendatrons to the Councrl for the
rmplementatron of ths concept to the
sailsfactron of all Alhes. takrng into account
ongomg rrork to adapt mrlrtan' strucfurcs
and procedurcs."
40. On the other hand. despitc the euphonc
comments of all the mrusters presenl rt rs qurtc
clear that the der,rhsh task of u'orkrng out the detarl
strll has to be tacklcd.
4l The brealithrough u'hrch led to thrs
reconfirmatron of the CJTF concept as a raable
solutron consisted mamlv m the acccptance bv all
allies of the need to identrfv and prepare rn advance
the milrtary asscts. structures and staffthat could bc
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requlred for an operation undertaken by and under
the responsibililv of WEU. The separable but not
separate forces may thus be grven a specific
European rdentrtv wrth a dual task.
42 It rs thought that rn the foreseeable future the
most hkell'mrlitan' actions lrrll take place rr a non-
Article 5 framelrork of peacekeepurg, peace
restoration, and humarutanan and rescue tasks.
Such actrons could be put under NATO command
by a group of NATO member states or. as is now
the case m Bosrua and Herzegovrna, by a
combrration of NATO and non-NATO member
states. If such actions fitted lnto the framervork of
the Petersberg tasks, they could also take place
undcr WEU command, possrbly u-rth the parti-
crpation of non-WEU member states. WEU could
then ask NATO to actrvate the CJTF concept.
43 At present, rt rs strll too early to conclude that
CJTFs are readl'for deplolment NATO's polrtical
and milrtary authorittes, m close cooperatton llrth
WEU. are strll uorkrng out thc manl' detarls,
rnvolr.rng not onll'techrucal but also malor polrtrcal
lSSUES
44. In its Berlrr commuruque the Councrl gave
an urdrcation of the complexrq'of the tssues at hand,
u'hen rt set out the gurdrng fundamental objectives
for an mprovement of the Alliance's capabrlrt-v to
fulfil its roles and missions. It stated that rts first
objcctive xas
"To cnsure the Alliance's mrlitary
effectiveness so that it is able. m the changrng
securitv environment facurg Europe, to
perform its traditronal mtssion of collective
defence and through flexrble and agreed
procedures to undertake ne\\' roles rl
changrng crrcumstances, based on
a renovated srrgle multrnational com-
mand structure rvhrch reflects the
strategrc situatton ln Europe and enables
all allies to participate full1'and u'hrch is
able to undertake all mrssions through
procedures to be defined in accordance
urth decisions by thc Councrl;
- 
HQ structures rvhrch are more deplol'able
and forces u'hrch are more mobrle, both
capable of being sustaured for extended
penods.
- 
the abrlrtl, to pronde for incrcased
partrcrpation of parher countries and to
rrtegrate new members rrto the Allnnce's
mrlitary structure,
- 
the abrhS'to mount NATO non-Article 5
operations, gurded b1'the conc€pt of one
system capable of performing multiple
functrons. We wrll further develop
fleruble arrangements capable of
undertaklng a vanelv of missions and
takrng into account national dectsions on
partrcipatron rn each operatton. building
upon the strength of NATO's exrstutg
arrangements These operations may
drffer from one another in contnbutions
by Allies and. as a result of Courcrl
decrsions on a case-by-case basts, aspects
of mrlrtary command and control The
CJTF concept is central to our approach
for assemblurg forces for contrngency'
operations and organisrrg their command
urthm the Alliance. Consistent wrth the
goal of burldrng the European secunh'
and defencc rdentrty'r,rrthm NATO, these
arrangements should penrut all European
allies to plal' a larger role rn NATO's
mrlitary and command structures and, as
appropnate, ut conttngency operatlons
undertaken by the Alliance;
mcreased polrtrcal-nulitary cooperation m
particular through the Policy
Coordrnatron Group (PCG) and effectrve
exercise of politrcal control b1' the North
Atlantrc Councrl through the Mtlitary
Commrttee;
- 
the nced for cost-effectiveness."
45. At therr meeting rn Brussels on 13 June
1996, the Defence Mrmsters of the North Atlantic
Council prouded the Permanent Councrl and the
Military Commrttee wrth polrtrcal guidehnes m
order to enable them to rmplement rn practice the
decisions taken m Berhn. In therr final com-
muruqud, mrrusters declared the followrng:
"We uelcomed the approval of the combined
lornt task force (CJTF) concept and noted rn
particular that arrangemcnts urll be made for
the particrpation of all allies m CJTF nucler
estabhshed in Alhance headquarters. CJTFs
- 
multrnational and multi-senace formations
established for specific contrngency opera-
tions 
- 
wrll pronde a more flexble and
efficrent means to enablc the Alliance to
10
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generate forces at short notice. The CJTF
concept lrill also help to rmprove cooperatlon
wrth WEU. It wrll rn addrtion facilitate the
participation of non-NATO nations ur the
Alliance's ncrv mrssions.
We directed the NAC rn permanent session
with the adnce of the NATO mrlitary
authontres to take forward the imple-
mentation of the CJTF concept to the
satisfactron of all allies, ffi o matter of
pnoriq,, urcluding in partrcular the locatron,
slze, numbsr and structure of CJTF
headquarters elements and their operatrng
procedures, takmg mto account the evohrng
rnork on the future NATO command
structure Ttus should urclude facilrtatrng
participation by partners rr CJTFs at an
early stage. There should be contrnuurg
coordmation wrth WEU. We requested the
Councrl rr permanent session to report on
progress at our mectrng rn December. We
decided that, as part of tlus process, an
exerclse should be conducted as soon as
practicable, based on the deplolment of a
CJTF for a NATO-led contrngency opera-
tron. We also iwrte WEU to work r.r'ith
NATO on the preparation for a subsequent
CJTF exercise based on a WEUled
operation
We instructed the Mrlrtary Committee to
develop rapidll' the terms of reference for a
Capabrlrties Coordrnation Cell It urll
pror.rde staff support to the Military
Committee on contmgency-related matters
and assrst the Mrlitary Comrruttee tn
provrdrng planmng guidance to the malor
NATO commanders. We have also mstruc-
ted the NATO mrlrtary authonties to develop
the terms of reference of the combured 
.yornt
planmng staff which would perform
centrahsed CJTF headquarters planntng
functrons and coordrnation wrth all relevant
headquarters, as well as wrth forces that
mrght serve under a CJTF headquarters, and
as appropnate urth the WEU Plannrng Cell."
46. A summary of ttus shows that the CJTF
concept is intended to:
- 
provrdc rapidlydeployable, multrnational,
multr-semce task forces, together uith
command and control capabilities, drawn
from the Allnnce's integrated nulrtarl'
comnund strucfure,
enhance the European secunq' and
defence rdentrty by makrng CJTF
headquarters and CJTFs 
- 
and/or
components thereof 
- 
available to WEU
for specific operations; and
facilitate the incorporatron of potential
contnbutrons from non-NATO nations rn
contrngency operations outside the realm
of the Alhance's collective defence
47. The pnmary mrssion of a CJTF is to conduct
contrrgency operations outsrde the rmmedrate scopc
of NATO collectrve defence missions, rncludrng
those camed out rn accordance nith Uruted Natrons
Secuntl' Council resolutrons, or on the basrs of an
OSCE mandate. either NATO- or WEU-led. The
attempt has therefore been made from the outset to
facilrtate partner participation rn the CJTF concept.
ur close coordrnatron u.rth WEU NATO is norv
developrng an excrcrse schedule wfuch, rn the first
instance, wrll see an exerclse based on the
deploynent of a CJTF for a NATO-led contrngcno'
operation. The nexl step wrll be to rrvtte WEU to
work urth NATO on preparations for a subsequent
CJTF exercise based on a WEU-led operatron. It
should be noted that the valuable expenences garncd
by non-Alliance natrons through therr participation
in the IFOR russlon m former Yugoslavra will play
an important role m thc further development of the
participatron of non-NATO nations in CJTFs.
48 At a meetng at NATO headquarters, the
Defence Commrttee u'as mformed about some
specific issues related to CJTFs, wtuch clanficd thc
progress recently made m thc rmplementation of tlus
concept
CJTF capabrlrtres: CJTFs are considered
to be a functional capabilrt-v and an
rntegral part of Alhance structures It
must be possible for CJTFs to be
deplol'ed promptly and efficiently, and for
them to be suslaurable for a g'hole
spectrum of peace support operailons as
u'ell as other non-collective defence
contrrgencies u,luch we no\\'face rr our
emergmg securiq' environment;
CJTF planmng to support the neu'
planning drmension of CJTF, a
Capabrlrtres Coordrnatron Cell has been
ll
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established urthrn the mtematronal mrli-
tary staff at NATO headquartcrs
Broadll, speakrng, thrs Cell rs required to
prol,ide staff support to the Mrlrtary
Commrttec on contingency-relatcd
matters and assst the Mrlitary Commrttee
rn providrng plannmg gurdance to the
ma.1or NATO commanders Terms of
reference are also berng drawn up for the
neu11'rcstablished combined lourt plan-
rung staff (CJPS) at SHAPE head-
quarters. The CJPS urll perform central-
rsed CJTF hcadquarters plannurg fiurc-
trons and urll coordmate tuth all relevant
headquarters. as u'ell as xrth forces that
mrght serve under a CJTF headquarters
and. as appropnate. urth the WEU
Planning Cell.
CJTF headquarters command arrange-
mcnts and headquarters are oblrousll' an
important element of thc CJTF concept.
A modular approach has been adopted
for CJTF headquarters based on "nuclel"
or core staffs and "modules", rn gencral
formed b1' doublc-hatted personnel rn
vanous NATO headquartcrs. Under tlus
approach. a CJTF headquarters rvould be
crcated b1' actrvatrng a nucleus rn one
NATO hcadquarters and then expandmg
mto a full CJTF headquarters urth
modules from other headquarters of the
NATO command structure as rvell as
from other national and multuratronal
headquarters of Alhance members
Nthough the details of the CJTF
headquarters model are )ct to be
dcveloped. the mvolvement of pcrsonnel
from non-alhcd natrons ln CJTF
headquarters staffs can bc assumcd. as
appropnate. for plannmg and operations,
depcndmg on natronal force contnbutions
A fullvdeveloped CJTF conccpt should
factlrtate tle urcorporatron of staff repre-
sentation, forccs and otler contnbutrons
from non-NATO nations in CJTF plan-
rung and actrvaflon. rncludrng CJTF
headquartcrs. for exercrses and actual
operations. as directed b1'the Council;
WEU-lcd CJTF operations: ur crrcum-
stanccs u'here the Alliance rvould choose
not to bc urvolved. on thc basrs of
NATOMEU Councrl consultatrons. rt rs
antrcrpated that WEU could request the
use of NATO CJTF headquarters for an
operatron under its command It rvould
be for the Council, takmg Mrlrtarl'
Commrttec adl'ice rnto account. to
authonse the transfer of CJTF head-
quarters. or elements thereof. and other
Alhance assets to WEU. Thc consul-
tatrve process. request optrons and
command and control issues urll have to
be defined in due course.
49 In thc rmmedrate future, the attention of
NATO's nulitary authontres u,rll focus on the
folloll'rng specrfic lssues'
development of a Milrtan, Commrttee
drrectrve for the rmplementation of the
CJTF concept:
submrssion of detarled recommcndations
to thc North Atlantic Council on the
establishment of CJTF nucler m eKstmg
NATO headquarters. and
productron of a malor NATO commander
doctnnc on the functioning, size and
compositron of hcadquarters. nuclei,
modules and forces
50. At NATO, it u'as emphasised that. to begrn
urth, rmplementatron uill bc applied to current
command structures and assets, but that tlus *rll rn
trme be adaptcd to a nerv command structurc rvhrch
should be the result of the efforts no*'being made to
adapt the rntemal structurcs of the Alliance.
5l Meanu'hrle, rt has been unarumousll' decided
that the North Atlanhc Council should. ur the first
rnstancc, desrgrate as parent hcadquarters urth
"nuclei" or core staffs STzuKFLTLANT m
Norfolk, Vrrgrma, *rth the Command Stup USS
"Mount Wlutnev" for sea-supported CJTF
operations. and AFCENT rn Bnmssum and
AFSOITTH ur Naplcs for land-supported CJTF
operatrons At thc same time. tlus decrsron docs not
exclude the desrgrratron of other headquarters rn the
future NATO command structurcs.
52 Notwrthstandrng mrnrstcnal euphona over
Europearusation through rmplemcntatron of the
CJTF concept after the Berhn meetmg ur June 1996,
the real garns for Europc should not bc cxaggerated
t2
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53. Accordrng to the agreement reached m
Berlm, Europeans can in theory use NATO assets
u: operations ur ufuch the Unitcd States does not
ursh to particrpate. On the other hand, the Umted
States has rmposed rts oun condrtrons, accordrng to
which
- 
the Uruted States must agree with the
operation,
SACEU& a Uruted States commander,
remalns commander urth overall
responsrbrhh'for NATO assets used rr a
European-lcd operation;
- 
the forces mvolvcd rn a EuropeanJed
operation must be approved by NATO
and follorv NATO procedures.
54. [n other N,ords, as has becn sard rr an earlier
Defence Commrttee report:, the European securih
and defence identit'v' u,rll still be dependent on the
Uruted States. rvtuch controls the assets that are
consrdered cssenlal for EuropeanJed operatrons It
has nghtll'been pornted out that NATO has ven'
feu' assets of its oxn an air dcfence system. some 
-
mostlr' fixed 
- 
command, control and communi-
catrons assets which do not serve much use in
urtervenilons, oil prpehnes and about three dozcn
AWACs aircraft. For operatrons of an)'
mpofiance, Europeans uould need American
assets. long-range heaw' transport arcraft, air-
refuelhng capabrlrties and satellite rntclligence
svstems
55 If Europeans \\'ere reallv senous about the
dcvelopment of therr secunq' and defence rdentitl',
thel'rvould have no chorce other than to develop and
acquire their oun asscts. The lrerv taken rn the
abovementroned Defence Commrttee report has not
changed follow'rng the Berlm and Brusscls meetrngs
It rvas noted then that.
"Thc agrcemcnt norv reached on CJTF
prolrdes them virth an mtenrn penod to put
ther own house rn ordcr. For many vears,
Europe has ensurcd rts secunty and defence
farrll'chcapll' because it has been able to rell'
on the Urutcd States for all possible
emergencies. In the foreseeablc future, it u,rll
2. Assembll' Document 1519. paragraph 23. The
United States and secun$' in Europe, Rapporteur Mr
Blaaurv
strll be able to rcly' on the Amencans for
North Atlantrc Treatv Artrcle 5 emergencies
For non-Article 5 emergencres. there rs a non
Treaq-6a5a6 grev zone. In such cases. erthcr
the United States ma1'participatc fully and
on a voluntarv basis ur u'hat can be callcd a
NATO operabon. or the North Atlantrc
Council may' prolidc. also on a voluntan,
basis, CJTF for European-led operatrons.
There are no obligations and no guarantees
for these emergencles, but Europe has no
choice but to accept thrs srtuatron sunpll'
because it lacks the means to do othenrrse.
On the other hand, nobodl' can dcnl'that thrs
inadequate secun[,' arrangemcnt can onll' be
accepted temporanll,. Europe u'ill have to
meet the serious shortcomrngs rn its secunh'
and defencc by startng to devclop and
acqulre its olln strategc assets rn the fields
of lift, logistrcs and C4l. mthout delay, if it
senously rntends to develop a European
secunty and defence rdentrtl'."
56. At present, hou'ever, most 
- 
if not all 
-
rvestem European countnes are shourng great
reluctance to develop real mrhtary capabrlrties.
Deeper cuts are beurg madc m defence budgets
almost every \'ear. France, tra&Ionally an lmpor-
tant defence spender. rs bnngrng rn s\\'eeplng
reforms and is reducrng rts armed forces and
procurement prograrnmes, rihich mav affect malor
prograrnmes such as the Future Large A,rrcraft and
the Trger anti-tank hehcopter. At the same trme. the
German defence budget is under hcaw pressure.
u'hrch may seriousll, delal' vrtal programmes such
as the Franco4erman strategic programmc to burld
the Hclios 2 and Horus satellites and the cooperative
programme uith Itall', Spaur and the United
Krngdom to build the Eurofighter.
57 An American anall'st3 has called the present
Europeanisation of NATO lrttle more than a
converuent myth, partll' becausc the European
Uruon is apparentlv not prepared to cstablish a
genume cornmon foreign and secun['policv at its
current intergovemmental conference and also
because European countnes are fierceh' reducrrg
their defence budgets n order to mect the budget
deficit cnteria for monetan union.
3 Phihp H Gordon, "Europeanisatron" of NATO
convenient m11h, Internattonol Herald Tnbune.
June 1996,
a
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V. Development of the European security
and defence identity (ESDI)
58. At the North Atlantrc Cotrncrl's meetmg ln
Berlm on 3 Junc 1996. rmportant decisrons r,rere
also taken as regards the development of the
European securiry' and defence identrtr, (ESDI)
Thesc dccrsrons rr-ould not have been possrblc m thc
abscnce of parallel developments rn the rmplemen-
tatron of the CJTF conccpt and the adaptation of
NATO's command structures
59. To understand the fulI sigruficance of tlus
devclopmcnt, rt is essential to note the relevant
paragraphs of the commuruque rssued after the
Berlm meetmg. ufuch read as follorvs
"The thrrd ob.;ective is the dcvelopment of the
European secuntv and defence rdentrty'
u-rthrn the Alliance Takmg full advantage of
the approved CJTF concept, thrs idcntr['wrll
bc groundcd on sound mrlrtan,pnncrplcs and
supportcd b1' appropnate mrlitary planrung
and permrt thc crcailon of nulrtanll' coherent
and effective forces capable of operatmg
under the polrtrcal control and strategic
drrection of WEU.
As an essentral element of the development of
thrs identrf'. u-e rull prepare. wrth the
rryoh'cmcnt of NATO and WEU. for WEU-
led operatrons (rncludurg planrung and erer-
cising of command elements and forces).
Such preparatrons urtlun thc Alhancc should
take urto account the particrpatron. rncludng
m Europcan command arrangements, of all
European alhes if thel'\\'ere so to choose. It
urll be based on
- 
rdentrficatron. urthin the Alhance, of the
tlpes of separable but not separate
capabilrtres. assets and support assets as
rvell as, m order to prepare for WEU-led
operations. separable but not scparatc
headquarters. headquarters elements and
command posltlons, tlut rvould bc
required to command and conduct WEU-
Ied operatrons and u'llch could bc made
avarlable. subject to decisron bv the North
Atlantic Council:
elaboration of appropnate multrnatronal
European command arrangements wrthm
NATO, consistent uith and taking full
advantage of the CJTF concept. able to
prcpare. support. command and conduct
the WEU-led operailons Thrs rmphes
doublc-hatting appropnate personnel wrth
thc NATO command structure to perform
thcse functrons Such European com-
mand arrangements should be rdentrfiable
and the arrangements should be
sufficrentll' rvell articulated to permlt the
rapid constitutron of a mrlrtanlv coherent
and effectrve operational force
Further. the Alliance uill support the
development of the ESDI u'rthin NATO bv
conductmg at thc request of and ut
coordmatron urth WEU. mrlitan' plarmrng
and exercnes for illustratn'e WEU mrsslons
rdentrfied b1'WEU On the basis of pohtrcal
gurdance to bc provided bv the WEU
Councrl and the NAC. such planmng u'ould
at a mrrumum:
prepare relcvant ffirmation on objec-
tivcs, scope and parhcrpatron for
rllustratrve WEU mssions.
idcntrfl' requircments for planmng and
excrclsrng of command elements and
forces for rllustratrve WEU-led opera-
tions.
dcvelop appropnate plans for submrssion
through the Mrlitary Commftee and the
North Atlantrc Council to WEU for
re\.1e\\'and approval
NATO and WEU should agree on
arrangements for rmplementrng such plans.
The North Atlantrc Council urll approve the
release of NATO assets and capabilities for
WEU-led operations, keep itself nformed on
thcrr use through morutonng urth the adl,rce
of the NATO mrlrtan' authoritres and
through regular consultations uith the WEU
Councrl and kecp therr use under relrex'
On the basrs of the guidelines agreed todar',
u'e have tasked the Council ur permanent
sesslon. wrth the advice of NATO's militan'
authontres,
- 
to provide guidance and develop specific
proposals for further adaptrng the
Allnnce's structures and procedures ;
l.t
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- 
to develop, \\lth regard to the European
secunty and defence rdentrtl, wrthrn the
Alliance. appropnate measures and
arrangements for unplementurg the
prousions of paragraph 7 Among the
arrangements u,luch require detalled
elaboration uill be provlslons for the
identification and release for use by WEU
of NATO capabilities, assets, and
headquarters and headquarters elcments
for mrssions to be performed by WEU;
any necessary supplernent to existing
information-shanng arrangements for the
conduct of WEU operatrons; and horv
consultations will be conducted wrth the
North Atlantic Council on the use of
NATO assets and capabrlities, rncludrng
the NATO morutonng of the use of these
assets,
and to report to our December meetrng with
recommendations for decisr ons
As part of thrs u.ork, ue have tasked the
Council rn pcrmanent scssion to renew the
ongolng uork on NATO's nulrtary command
structure and to report to us at our next
meeting uith recommendatrons. "
60. The Defence Mirusters of the North Atlantic
Counctl, meetrng rn Brussels on 13 June 1996,
associated themselves r,nth the abovementioned
decsrons taken rn Berhn. Thev also stated that:
"As part of NATO's contnbution to
devcloprng ESDI urthin the Alliance. rvc
have tasked our Permanent Representatrves,
wrth adr.rcc from the NATO milrtary
authorites, and u,rth particlpatlon of all
allies, to re\,ilew the defence planmng process
to ensure that rt continues to develop thc
forces and capabilrtres needed to conduct the
full rangc of Alliance missrons and rr
addrtron rs able to support mthin the Alliance
all European allies rn planning for the
conduct of WEU-led operations This u'ork
should be completed rrr tune to be considercd
at our December meetmg "
61. The Defence Mirusters also asked the
Council (a) to kcep under revierv the nork on the
Long-Term Study on the rmplementation of the
CJTF concept and on the adaptation of the Alliance
accordrng to the prrncrples agreed in Berhn.
includrng the building. uith the partrcrpation of all
allies, of thc ESDI llithin the Alhance, to ensure
they were conducted m a rapid. consistent and
mutualll' compatible way. and (b) to report to them
rn Deccmber.
62. Both at NATO headquarters and at WEU.
the Defence Commrttee u'as assured that both
orgarusations are closelv coordrnatrng therr efforts
to rmplemcnt the Berlrr decisions. Among other
thrngs. NATO ts now attempting to make a precisc
defirution of the NATO assets, headquarters.
headquarters elements and command positrons
u'hrch rvould be appropnate for usc rn WEU-led
operations.
63. NATO's political-milrtarl'bodies, such as the
Pohcy' Coordrnatron Group estabhshed rn Berlrr to
meet the need for closer coordination of political and
militarv lreuporrts. are now xorkrng to establish
procedurcs to proude for contrnuurg NATO-WEU
consultations and morutorurg of the use of NATO
assets by NATO nulitary authonties. ln accordance
wrth thc Defence Mrrusters' mstructrons as
mentioned above, NATO's milrtary authorities arc
re\4e$mg the defcnce planrung process ln order to
continue to develop the fulI range of NATO
mrssions, wfulc supporturg urthrn the Alhance all
Europcan allies rn planmng for the conduct of
WEU-led operations.
64. The mam idea behrnd the decisron to develop
an ESDI r,rithn NATO is that, insrde NATO,
Europe should be given the capabrhq' to plan and
lead autonomous operations for cnsrs management
and peacekccprng, rvlule usurg Alhance structures.
It should be possrble to deplov European armed
forces and assets and capabrlitres fiom the Alliance
structure once the appropnate decisron has been
taken by the North Atlantic Councrl.
65 The objectrve is to make sure that both
NATO and WEU can employ the same command
strucfure ln order to prevent superfluous
duphcation Addrtronal elements of a WEU mrlitary
structure should be formed rf thel' rvere absolutelv
esscntnl. It is thought that, m princrple, the entire
NATO command structure should be at the drsposal
of both NATO and WEU because it is rmpossiblc to
predrct the srzq scenanos, circumstanccs and
requirements of future opcrauons, erther wrthin or
urthout the frame'w,ork of Article 5. The question of
u'hat requirements are needed and rvhether NATO
or WEU urll lead an operatron can onlv be decided
on a casc-by-case basrs.
15
DOCI 4ENT 15-15
66 It rs understood that NATO's regronal
headquarters are to play a decstve role m WEU-led
opcratrons These headquarters not onl)'
accommodate the CJTF core staffs but, urth
double-hatted persormel, can also put their plarumg
and command capaci5' at the drsposal of WEU.
Regronal commands are therefore able to support
both the operattons commander and the force
commandcr of a WEU-led operatron. Thc sub-
regional commands urll be used as "componcnt
commalds" or "1ornt commands" for smaller
NATO-led or WEU-led operattons
67. Double-hatted structural elemcnts and
personnel should also be provrdcd at strategrc level
m order to prepare and coordrnate the necessal]'
support at that level for WEU-led opcratrons. Apart
from tlus, rt rs thought that the present malor NATO
commands 
- 
rn future to become strateglc
commands 
- 
urll functron as Supportmg Com-
manders m the case of WEUlcd operattons rvhtch
requrc planrung and coordmatlon on a strategrc
levcl. for rnstance for stratcglc arrhft or the
dcplolment of AWACs arcraft This arrangcment
could pave the ua1' for the use of US assets for
EuropeanJed operattons It could make it caster for
the Uruted Statcs to support such operations. even if
rt drd not pror,rde troops
68. The gencnc planrung process. u'hrch burlds
on the illustrative plans for WEU operations. forms
the basrs of contrgencl' and later operatronal
planning b1' the operattonal commanders Respon-
srbrlrtl' for the coordmatton of genenc planrung. thc
planmng of exerctses and rmtial contmgencv
planmng could bc given to the Deputl' SACEUR
rrho rvould be supported rn tlus role bv thc
combrned lourt planmng statr (C JPS)
69 It u'as mcntioned carher on that France's
decision ur Decembcr 1995 to becomc rnvolved
once agarn tn certam NATO mrlrtarl' structures
greatll' helped to accelerate negotlattons on the
CJTF and the relatcd rssue of thc development of
Europe's secunh' and defence idennf
10 France has apparentlv chosen to transform
NATO from urttun rather than tn'to ctrcumvent lt
b1, developrrg an rndependent European secuntv
and defcnce rdentr['through WEU alone It should
be noted. hou'ever. that Mruster de Charette has
also sard "Our iruttattve does not mcan that Francc
is relormng the urtegrated structures, for one ven'
simple reason: our request for thc European pillar to
be strcngthened rmphes a revieu' of the Alliance's
structures"a. Hc noted that srnce NATO's Brussels
summrt mcrcting of January 1994. when rt had
commrtted rtself to neu-. non-Artrcle 5 mrssions and
recogrused the need to develop a European secuntv
and defence identrty'. not enough progress had been
made lrr tlus ficld.
7l. The compronuse leadmg to the Bcrhn
communque u'as reached after mtenstve negotia-
trons and hard last-mrnute bargarmng bet$een the
alhes
72. The Uruted States. apparenth' rnsprred b1'
SACEUR bclieved that the authon[' of SACEUR
(a US commander) xould bc dmuushcd rf hrs
European subordrnates also functioned, el'cn m
peacetrme, as a mrlitary command prepared to
handle operattons mountcd b1' Europe alonc
European alhes, rn partrcular France. Germany'and
the Uruted Krngdom. argued that the Amencan
refusal to accommodate doublc-hatted Europcan
subordmatcs u'ould destrol'the politrcal purpose of
NATO restrucfunng and lcopardlse "a momentous
opporturutl' to reratalse the Alhancc for the next
decade"t.
73 Francc has made tt clear that it rmll further
rntcnsiS' rts cooperation and fuIl1' partrcrpate m
NATO's mrlrtan structures on conditton that the
posrtive rmport of thc commuruques tssued aftcr thc
June 1996 Bcrhn and Brussels mrnstenal mectrngs
rs actuall1 grven practtcal effect It constders t
cssentnl that the adaptatron of NATO's command
structures should gil'e the Europeans pcrmanent and
l'rsible rcpresentatton at the hrghcst levels rn the
NATO command structures together urth a
possrbrhh' for rt to rmplement tts otrn operatlons.
usrng Alliance assets rf the alhes agrec ln the first
placc, France u.ants a Europcan depu\' SACEUR
to be double-hatted. actrng both as SACEUR's
deputl' and at thc same trmc embodrrng Europe's
rdentrtv xrthin NATO. Apart from thrs. other
thrngs urll also havc to be changcd. subjcct to
negotiatron, m order to share responsrbihlcs bet-
ucen Europeans and Amcncans.
74 France ackno*'lcdgcs that WEU lacks
NATO's assets and capabrlitres, but consrders it a
natural cnr,rronment for cooperatton bchveen Euro-
pean countnes. Tho'should take advantage of tlus
frameu'ork by'tn'ing to create both thc pohtical and
mrlrtarl'capabilities for cooperaflon m thctr pnontl
I Le Jlonde. 7 Junc 1996
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fields of urterest and b1' coordmatmg their vrews on
secuntv and defence ln partrcular, jornt trarmng of
troops should be developed as a corrrmon mrlrtan,
pracfice of WEU member states rn complete
harmony urth that of the Atlantrc Alhance6
75. At the rrformal meetrng of NATO Defence
Mrrusters rr Bergen on 25-26 September 1996,
Charles Mrllon. the Frcnch Defence Muuster. said
that France wrll halt its process of reconcrlntron
wth NATO if French demands for a reform of the
Alliance's command structure are not mst. Later,
Mr Mrllon said that France wanted the tu,o marn
regronal commands to be headed by Europeans.
Thrs rvas ill rssue of "fundamental importance"
76. Progress on reform of the Alliance's
command structure to allorv it to expand eastwards
has stalled because of French and US drsagreements
about who should head the key' southem command
m Europe. The Uruted States holds the trro major
posts rr each of NATO's strategrc commands,
SACLANT and SACEUR. Hou'ever. France has
rnsisted tlnt the next two malor posts ur the peckrng
ordcr 
- 
the southem and northem commands rn
Europe 
- 
rotate among the European allies. That,
Mr Millon said. rvould grve thc Europeans
"permanent and rreversrble" r.rsrbilrtl,. Mr Millon
added that "rf a certain number of condrtions are not
respected, France will stay m her present positron"T.
But Robert Hurter, the US Ambassador to NATO,
has stated that "it rs absolutely' essentral and crucial
for the Uruted States to retam an Amencan
commander at the head of NATO headquarters rr
Naples". Wastungton refuses to give up tlus
regional command because of the vrtal importance
of rts geographc srtuation, its area of responsrbilitl'
and the presencc of the 6th Amencan fleet rn the
Medrtenanean. equrpped uith nuclear u'eapons'.
77. By nou,, t has become clear that France is
extremely senous m rts demands regardrng the
restructunng and Europearusation of NATO If
these demands are not met, France mal,verl,rvell
revcrse rts positron as rcgards NATO. fu has
already been explaured ur the rcccnt report on
"Orgarusurg secuntv ur Europe 
- 
defence aspects"
by Mr Baumel, Rapporteur, France has a number
ofgood reasons to reconsider its posrtron regardrng
6. Intervierv wrth Charles Millon
Handelsblad, 1l September 1996.
'7. International Herald Tribune, 26
1996.
8. Le lt{onde, 27 September 1996.
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NATO. But it is adamant ur its demands for the
Orgamsatron's restructuring and Europeanisatron.
It x'ould appear that manl' of rts European alhes ur
NATO apprecnte Francs's attrtude.
78. A solutron to the present stalemate mav
depend on relatrons betrvecn the Presrdents of thc
Uruted States and of France The French Presrdent.
Jacques Clurac, has untten a lctter to tus Umted
States counteryart. Brll Clurton. to explarn the
French position. In rt. Mr Cturac constders rt onlv
natural that Europeans should take over NATO's
Europcan commands and that the deputl'
commander-rn-cluef ofNATO forccs should also be
a European. He also stresses that rt should be
possible to rdentrfl the European elements ur the
chan of command at all trmes rncludmg pcacetme.
Mr Chnton has expressed opposltion to the pnnciple
of rotatrng the Naples-based southem command
among Europeanse. The Naples command urll
become even more unportant rn a rcstructured
NATO in ufuch thc current three regronal
commands are to be strearnlmcd under hvo
headquarters a southem one rn Naples and a
northem one in Bnrnssum In l,rex' of contururng
r,urest and rnstabrlrtv rn the southcm Medrterranean
and the Mrddle East. it is not surpnsrng that
AFSOUTH rs takrng on more rmportance for thc
Europeans
W. NATO enlargement
79. In its June 1996 Berhn commuruque, thc
North Atlantrc Council also rcaffrmed the
contrnuu:tg uork on enlargement and among other
thrngs declared the follor,nng.
"We reafErm our comriltnent to open the
Alhance to new members The process of
enlargcment s on track and ue are convurccd
that the overall adaptatron of the A-lhance
rvill facilrtatc this process As decided last
Deccmber, rre have a threefold proccss for
advancing our preparations tlus year \\,e are
conducting iur rntensified dralogue wrth
interested countnes; rnorkrng on a further
enhancement of PfP both to hclp possrblc
new members to lorn and to provide a strong
long-term parftrerslup xith NATO for others.
and we are considenng the necessan' rntemal
adaptations for enlargement "
17
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80. At prescnt, consultations are takrng place rn
the framervork of an rntensrficd dralogue bctw'een
NATO and cach of the 11 states wfuch have
exphcrth' askcd to become a member of NATO
Thcse statcs are Albarua. the Czech Rcpublic,
Estorua, the Former Yugoslav Repubhc of
Macedorua (FYROM), Hungarl'. Latvra, Ltthuarua,
Poland. Romarua. Slovakra and Sloverua. Apart
from tlus. NATO n conductrng an mtensrfied
&alogue urth Azerbarlan, Bulgana. Frnland and
Llkrame, rts rr[rm purposo bcurg to extend
cooperation ur the frameuork of the Parhcrshrp for
Peace It is to be noted that enlargement consrd-
eratlons are at the same trme berng taken rnto
account rn NATO's dehberatrons and dccrsions on
its rnternal adaptation process. The North Atlantic
Cor.rncrl has further reaffirmed rts dctermrnation
"that the proc€ss of opemng thc Alhance to nerv
members should not creatc ncu, drndrng hnes rn
Europe, or rsolate anv countn/'. Its oblective
remalns "ever closer and deeper cooperatrve ties
wrth all North Atlantrc Cooperailon Councrl
(NACC) and Partnershp for Peacc (PfP) partners
rvho ursh to burld such relatrons" uith the Alliance
8l A srnopsis of the state of affarrs rr the
enlargement drscussron last summcr, rrcludrng the
latest dcvclopmcnts at that trme. rvas rncluded m the
Dcfcncc Committec's report "The Uruted States and
securitl' in Europe". submtted b1, Mr Blaauw.
Rapporteur. n-hrch u'as adopted by the Asscmbly rn
June 199610
82 Slnce then, there have been a number of neu,
developments u'tuch are rrorth mcntrorung
NATO's membcr states have ur particular
recogruscd that Europc's secun['wrll not rmprove if
relations urth Russn are neglected.
83 As regards the trmetable of the enlargement
process. there norv se€ms to be a general
understandrng among NATO member states that a
formal m\,ltatron for neu' members to lotr mrght be
rssued at thc 1997 NATO summrt meetrng. to be
follou'ed by negotiations on thcir entry u'tuch, rf the
present preparatlons are successful. could be rvound
up w,rthm a feu'months. Thrs mrght leave enough
trme for an amendment to the Washrngton Trea['to
be ratrfied by the member states before Apnl 1999,
the 50th amiversarv of the Treatl'.
84. NATO is to meet rn December 1996 to set a
date for a summrt confercnce. It urll probably be
l0 Assembh' Document 1519
hcld before July and rrrll name the first countnes
ehgrble for membersllp. The NATO Secrctary-
General, Jauer Solana. has sard that NATO is
engaged ur a "tlreefold process. each part of n'tuch
should converge torvards a comrnon goal and lcad to
an Alhance summrt half u'a-r- through 1997" Thc
three parts of the process are: NATO's mternal
adaptatron to the nerv situailon. negotiatrons on the
operung up of the Orgarusation to ne\\,countnes and
a redefimtion of relatrons uith MoscorvlI
(a) Relahons wfih Russru as seen by NATO and
tts member states
85. ln Berlm, on 4 June 1996, thc 16 NATO
Forergr Mmrsters had a mcetmg mth Russia's
Forergn Mrmster, Yevgeny Pnmakov, at uhrch
relations between the Alhance and Russra \\'ere one
of the sublects drscussed. After tlus meetmg, Mr
Pnmakov dcclared that Russia was seekrng to
dcvelop its relatrons with NATO and rvclcomed the
fact that enlargement \\'as not "predetermmed" and
allou'ed room for drscussron. Accordrrg to Westcm
drplomats urvolved rr talks urth Russra, the Russran
lcaderslup could agree to some central European
countnes Jolrung NATO. on condrtron that rt drd not
statron eithcr allicd troops or nuclear \\'eapons on
the territorl' of the nerv member states. Accession
of the Baltrc states to NATO rc anathema to Russn.
86 Both Germanl- and the Urutcd States have
been seckrng actrvell'to urtensr!'the dralogue urth
Russra, perfectll'au'are that there can be no secuntl'
and stabrlrty'arrangement rn Europe urthout proper
Russran mvolvement Ncither countn' can afford to
have strarned relatrons ruth Russra for stratcgrc,
political and cconomrc reasons.
87 At the begrnning of September 1996, the
Uruted States Secretary of State, Warren Chns-
topher, therefore called for a formal chartcr to
govem NATO's relatrons urth Russia Ttus charter.
provrdmg for polrtical consultations and secun\'
cooperatron. should be read- rn trme for thc summrt
meetmg 
- 
tcntatrvell' scheduled for June 1997 
- 
at
ullch NATO will announce rts enlargement plans
88. At the same trme. Mr Chnstophcr called for
the European Uruon to "move forward slliftll' uith
an expansive prograrnme of enlargement" Aware
that manl'central and eastern European countncs
uould not be able to join NATO, he ventured that
tlus EU enlargement prograrrune u'ould help "lock
l8
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m democratrc and markct reforms rn central and
eastem Europe"l2.
89. In an rmportant address to the German
Bundestag on l1 September 1996 after visiting
President Yeltsur. Chancellor Kohl declared that he
had reached agreement u-rth the Uruted States, the
Uruted Kingdom and France that. rn vrerv of the
rntemal polrtrcal situatron in Russra. the debate on
NATO enlargement should not resume untrl ncxt
)'ear Russn should not be confronted w'rth a fart
accomph dunng Presrdent Yeltsrn's lllness
Accordrng to the Chancellor, Presrdent Yeltsrr was
prcpared to have the necessan' talks on NATO
enlargement. The Chancellor uamed that efforts to
enlarge NATO should not stir up a homet's ncst m
the process. The enlargement process should takc
account of thc secunty mtercsts of all the states in
the regron. rncludrng Russia and Ukrarne. Untrl the
end of 1996. NATO should concentrate on rts or.rn
restructunng and on talks urth those candrdate
countncs seekrng admrssion to an enlarged NATO
90. Addressrng the Forum for the Future, m
Pans on 23 September 1996, the NATO Secretary-
General, Jauer Solana. said NATO rvould have to
contrnue to s'ork on a series of proposals givurg
propcr substance to the term "specral relations",
wrth reference to Russia Mr Solana said there
\\'ere hvo aspects to NATO's stance on Russu on
lhc one hand. Moscorv must not be allowed to have
a !'eto on enlargement but, on the other, it had to be
involved m European securin issues.
9I A number of proposals are alreadl' on the
table: the first of these rs a charter that u'ould put
relatrons bets'een NATO and Russia on a formal
footmg, the second makes prorasron for mutual
representation at NATO headquarters lr Europc
and at Russran milrtary headquarters. the thrrd
envsagcs cooperation betu'een NATO and Russia
on armamcnts
92. NATO's proposal to the Krcmhn is that a
charter on a strategic parherstup should contarn
three parts the first deahng urth pnncrples, the
second uith procedures for consultatron betueen
NATO and Russia on European secunt_v. and the
tturd uith those areas rn u'tuch there is scope for
cooperation Mr Solana recently added to lus
earher statements that NATO has no rntentron of
statiomng nuclear \\eapons ur central European
countnes that mrght be nvrted to.lorn NATO.
93 NATO has made it clear that it does not lfte
the rdea of a "non-aggresslon" pact. because that
could rmply'that rt, NATO. nlght have aggressivc
desrgnstt.
94. At the ffirmal meetrng of NATO Defence
Mrrusters rn Bergen on25-26 September 1996. Mr
Perry,. the US Dcfence Secrctan,. uho had earlier
stressed that the enlargement process u,ould begin
next vcar u'hatel'er Moscorv sard, offered to
accommodate Russnn liaison officers at every level
of the Alliance's command structure, u'rth perm-
anent offices for them and therr NATO counterparts
m each other's headquartersra. Mr Perry' declared
that NATO rs burldrng a crcle of secuntl, m Europe
and he believes that Europe cannot be secure unless
Russia is rnsrde that crrcle. xorkrng together wrth
thc Alhance The Pentagon savs Russn could be
rrvolved rn nrtualll' eventhrng NATO does and
that the onll,exception to tlus concems its collective
defence obhgatrons based on Artrclc 5 Thrs
formula x'ould enable Russn to take part rn a host
of NATO committees and forums for mrlrtarv
planmng pu.poses".
95. After a meeting rn Berlin on 7 October 1996.
the Frcnch and German Forergrr Muusters sard
Russia should be urcludcd m any ner.v European
secunt_v svstem The French Foreign Muuster.
Herv6 de Charette. said NATO and Russra must
agree on a "spccral rclationshrp" and thc Russrans
should not be shut out ofthe process of expandrng
NATO to eastem Europe. He also emphasised that
NATO's rclatronstup rrrth Russn must be
"sustained rn a spint of partrership". Both
Muusters sard thel'agrced that rr developrng a new
European secunt!' structurc. no "grel' areas" should
evoh'e The Mirusters also said that Russra and
[,kraine should be draun rnto the nerv European
secuntv process at a level reflccturg their size and
influencer6 The French and the Germans. even
more so. are urgmg that a charter wrth Russra be
rvorked out before gomg ahead urth NATO
enlargementlT
13. the Indcpendent, 17 October 1996
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96. Dunng a vrsit to Russn on 16-18 Octobcr
1996. Wrlham Pern', the US Defence Secretary',
assured thc Russran Duma that "NATO rs no tlreat
to Russia" Mr Pcm' told the Duma that the
oblectrve lvas to create a r.ude area of secunh'.
rncludrng Russn. uhrch uould also be rn'"rted to
slgn a specral accord that u'ould mstrtutronahse
consultauon. trarmng programmes. and the
exchange of officers at mrlrtan' schools and head-
quarters Mr Perr_v' appealed to Russran polrtrcnns
to ratrfi,the START II arms reductron trea['. srgned
rn January 1993. On thc other hand, before he
amved ur Moscou'. Mr Pcrry *,arnod Russra that
refusal to ratift'thc trcatv rvould havc no effect on
NATO's plans to enlarge by takrng rn eastem
European countries. and emphasrsed that there rvas
no lmk betrveen the hro lssues. It is to be noted here
that cooperatron betu-een NATO and Russra is
crucnl to secure the rmplementatron of the START
II strateglc arrns treat\', utuch urll reducc
superpo\\'er nuclcar u'arheads from 6 000 each to
feu'er than 3 500 cach by 2003
97 ln a malor foreigr policl' speech delivered in
Dctrort, the Presrdent of the Uruted States. Brll
Chnton, clearlv alludrng to Russra. said that u'tule
no country u'ould have a veto on NATO
enlargemcnt. thc proccss rvould be undertaken rn
such a rval'that all natrons. Russra mcluded. rvould
bcnefit. Mr Clurton sard that the Uruted States
msrsts that "NATO enlargement is not drected
agarnst arx'one but rather arms to promote stabrhq'
and nurture 1'oung democracies". Mr Clurton
pledged that no-onc would bc left rr "a grel' zone of
msecuntv"l8.
(b) Relafions v'tth Russm 
- 
the Rttssian vtew
98 Understandabll'. Russra has never shoun anv
enthusrasm about NATO's rntentrons to admtt
central Europcan countnes. Although NATO has
never had an1' offensrve mtentions, rt should be
understood that Russia 
- 
even if not actualll'
threatcned feels uneas)' about the possrble
expansion of rts former adversan' rnto central
European countnes uhich prevrouslv came under
the spherc of mfluence of the former Sovret Uruon rn
even' respect The Russnn polrtical and mrlitan'
leadershrp has tned everythrrg rangmg from overt
threats urth countermeasurcs to fnendll' and
concrliaton' proposals to convince NATO that rt
uould be unurse, dangerous and porntless to
cnlarge, all urthout much success. On the other
hand. as a consequence of all thrs lockeyng. NATO
member statcs havc bccn remmdcd that they cannot
try to establish a nerv secunt)' order ur Europe
*,rthout senoush' takmg mto account Russra's
posrtron and mterests.
99 Ov'er the past months. Russia has becn more
forthcomrng on this rssue. aware that rts former
central European alhes are norv urdepcndcnt statcs
free to choose their alhances. and that rt cannot
clarm the nght to excrcise a veto on NATO
enlargcmcnt.
100 At the NATO sumrrut meetmg rn Berlur on
3.1 June 1996. the Russmn Forergn Mrruster,
Yevgenl,Pnmakov, told NATO Forergn Mrrusters
that Moscou' acknoulcdged the nght of eastem
European nations to 
.1orn NATO but could not
tolerate westem mrlrtarl'forces being deploled near
Russra's borders Accordrng to a NATO officnl,
Mr Pnmakov prarsed cooperatron betlleen Russnn
and NATO troops rn Bosrua as a model for futurc
operations and urged trghter coordrnation behveen
Moscorv and the West on nuclear prohferation and
antr-ballistrc mrssrle rcsearch Mr Pnmakov also
sard hc *'as "pleased to see that NATO u'as not
forcurg thc issue of enlargrng rts structures tou'ards
Russia's border b1'takrng urulateral decsrons. but
u'as rnstead engagmg ur a dralogue ruth Russia on
ths sublect"le.
l0l. ln a commuruqud issued rr late September
1996. the Kremhn sard that ufule Bons Yeltsrn, the
Russmn head of state, could enterlam the posstbihS,
of NATO enlargement torvards eastem Europe, this
u'ould onlv be possrble after an agrecmcnt to that
end had been srgred urth Russia and the proccss
could not take place the other rvav round For tus
part. Mr Pnmakov sard that rf NATO went ahead
uith rts enlargement plans, a uhole senes of
agreements rvould have to be rer.rcs'ed, rr particular
to "readlust the Treatl' on Conlentronal Forces rr
Europc to the nerv srtuation"?t'.
102 It has been knoun for a long trne that Russra
is crpcnencurg problems wrth rmplementmg thc
1990 Treatl, on Conventional Forces rn Europc
(CFE). rn partrcular because of chroruc unrest on its
southem border n the Caucasus region and rn
central Asn. It had spccificalll' asked to be
exempted from unplementurg the CFE agreemcnt ut
79 Le ]Ionde. 6 June 1996
20 Le lulonde. I October 199618. Internattonal Herald Tnbune. 2-l October 1996
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four regions ur the south. Furallr,. on I June 1996,
the signatory' states, meetrng at the CFE review
conference rn Vierura, backed an earlier Uruted
States-Russian agreement authorising the
deploynent of Russian forces. especially' ur the
Caucasus, in exccss of the ceihngs set by the
onglral CFE Treat_v
103. Russia mrght nox' argue that rf Poland and
other eastem European countnes become part of
NATO, their troops should count as a part of the
Alhance, wtuch would mean that NATO uould be
nolatrng the Treatr'2I
104 Another trea[' u,hrch could be a bone of
contentron rn the comrng discussions wrth Russra is
the START II trea[' on strategrc nuclear weapons.
srgned rn January 1993 Tlus treat1,, ratrfied by the
Uruted States Senate m Januarv 1996 but not 
-vet
ratified by the Russian Duma, commrts the Uruted
States and Russn to reduce the number of their
long-range nuclear u'arheads to 3 500 or less by'the
year 2003, u'hrle banrung all land-based nuclear
\ eapons wrth multrple lvarheads. includrng Russra's
most porverful mrssile. the SS-18.
105 There are milly reasons for the Russran
Duma to delal' ratrficatron of START II, as well as
the fact that President Yeltsrn, u'ho is facrrg enough
problems as rt is urth Russia's rntemal polrtrcal
srtuahon, has not made much of an effort to
persuade rt to do so
106 Frrstl1.. START II has been cnticised by
Russmn hardlmcrs for ehmrnatrng land-based
nuclear weapons uith multrplc warheads. one of the
Sovret Union's strongest assets, u'tule kecprrg
submanne-based s1'stems, an area ur wtuch the
Uruted States had the upper hand.
107. Secondlr'. Russran politicians argue that
contrrung econonuc and mrlrtary problems have
severell, hampered the countrl''s abrlrtl' to move
auay from multrple-rvarhead mrssilcs In order to
maintarr its maxrmum START II lmrts, Russia
would have to burld an addrtional 500 to 700 single-
u'arhead mrssiles togcther riith their launch systems
at a cost of US dollars 40 to 50 bilhon. Thrrdll',
some suggest linking raflficatron of START II to a
US pronuse that it wrll abrde by a stnct
interpretatron of the Anti-Balhstrc Missile Treaty,
and not develop an anti-nussile defence s1'stem.
108. In the Russran Duma. both commurust and
natronahst dcputres have attempted to link
ratrficatron of the START II trcatl' urth NATO's
en.largement plans. A Russnn Defence Mrustrv
official has been quoted as salmg that lus countrv
rvould seek quantrtatrve and qualitatrve changes rr
START II
109. On hrs first rasit to NATO headquarters rn
Brussels on 7-8 October 1996. Russra's Natronal
Secuntv Adlrscr, Alexander Lcbed, ll'ho was
drsmrssed tuo rvceks later, rvamcd NATO not to
rush rts plans for eastu'ard expanslon, hmtrng at the
possrbrhq, that the Russian Duma mav not ratifi'
erther the START II treatl, or a host of other arms
control treailes. Mr Ls'bed sad Russn lvould not
rcact "h1'stencalh'" rf NATO drd decrde to go ahead,
torung donn his earlier allusions to a reneu-ed
nuclear threat from Russia. He emphasised that
NATO should negotiatc urth Russn about the
latter's posrtion before extendrng rmtations to join
NATO to other countries in eastem Europe. A
charter u'as not enough. A treatv should be
concluded that rvas "vcn' spccrfic about what
Russra's dutres rvould be". Mr Lebed proposed that
NATO completc rts goals one step at a trmc,
startrng u'rth solr,rng the Orgarusatron's mtemal
restructunng problems, and follourng tlus up wrth
negotntlons w.rth Russn about NATO
enlargement2' Moscoro' contrnucs to call for a
legally brndmg treatv under ufuch the process of
NATO enlargemcnt s'ould be subject to lourt
decisrons. On the other hard. Mr Lebed
acknouledged that "polrtrcalll' and legalh," Russia
could not veto NATO expansion Accordmg to the
Russian Forcrgn Mrruster, Yevgeny Pnmakov.
Russia must be treated as a European superpower
on an equal footrng urth the Westcm Alhance. Mr
Pnmakov said that a compromrsc on NATO
enlargement u'as possible if "NATO is dcvelopcd
through a dralogue uith Russra and an undcr-
standrng urth Russn rs reached before decisrons on
enlargemcnt are made"23.
@ '[he Bolnc snrcs
ll0 Thc secunty' concems of the three Baltrc
states are.;ustrficd both on account of therr histoncal
expenence. their gcostrateglc posltlon and above all
therr proxrmrt_v to a very big country. Russia. u'hrch
in the past has at various trmes domrrated the entire
region. Estorua, Latr,ra and Lrthuarua thercfore
22. The ltr'all Street Journal. S Octobcr I996.
23 Internatrcnal Ilerald Tnbune.9 October 19962l.The Independent, 15 June 1996
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regard rrtegratron rn the West's three pohtical or
politrco-mrlrtarl, rnstrtutions, namelv. NATO. thc
European Uruon and Westem European Uruon. as a
guarantee not only'oftheir mdependence but also of
therr domestrc stabilrt_v and the secunt_y of therr
frontiers At tlus stage it should be stressed that the
presenc€ ur Estorua and Latraa of very szeable
Russian mrnonties, coupled urth shared frontiers
urth Russia 
- 
nluch are drsputed m the case of
Estoma 
- 
and wrth Belarus arc generalll, considered
b1' the Baltic states. perhaps nghtll' so, as factors
urth a potcnilal for destabilrsrng the domeslc
srtuatron.
I I l. In order to rvard off the abovementroned
dangers, the three govemments are srmultaneouslv
stnvrng to trghtcn control over the frontiers wrth
their largc ncrghbours, pnmanll' Russra and
Belarus, develop thcrr tnpartite cooperation on
secuntv and dcfence matters and rmprove therr
relations ruth Poland, Russn and Belarus. as ls
bome out bv the agrecments Lrthuarua has
concluded urth Poland, on the crcation of a
peacekeepurg force. and wrth Russia. free transit to
Kalrringrad, and b1' the agreements all three
countnes have concluded urth Russra concemmg
thc wrthdraual of Russran troops Mentron should
also be madc of cooperatron urth certarn other
countnes of the regron uhrch the three Baltic states
see as a means of strengthemng ther relatrons ulth
the EU and NATO. Relatrons betg'een Estorua and
the Nordrc countnes, rn partrcular Frrland (whose
Pnme Minister has clcarlv stated that Furland can
agree to NATO admrttrng the threc Baltrc states), as
u'ell as those betu'een Lithuarua and Poland can be
crted as examplcs There rs clearll' no doubt that
rmproved relatons betrveen Lrthuarua and Poland
also canl' advantages for the latter. u'tuch rs
aspinng to plav a maJor role rn central and eastcm
Europe.
ll2. Wth more specrfic regard to tnlateral
cooperatron, lt has to be remembered that
consultatrons on thc forcrgn polio' of Estorua.
Latua and Lrthuania arc hcld at several levels
(hcads of state, Baltrc Asscmbll'. forergn mrmsters).
the purpose being better coordinahon of mter-
national action Thc thrce states norv also rntend to
1on NATO. the EU and WEU together As for
their jornt cndeavours rn the field of secunS' and
defence proper. rt s rvofth mentlorung that the
principle of collectrve defence u-as adopted b1' the
Councrl of Baltrc Mrrusters and that a brpartite
agreement on rrulitary cooperatron u'as srgncd in
1995 ln accordance urth that agreement and wrth
the collective defence pnncrple, tnpartrte naval and
ar dcfence cooperatron programmes are nou, in
existence Thc formatron of a lornt battalion(BALTBAT) and the partrcrpailon of a Baltic
contmgent rn IFOR operations are good rllustrations
of the success of tnlateral cooperation among land
forces
I 13 Hou'ever. the ratio of forces n the regron rs
such that the three Baltic states take the raeu' that,
ufule therr combincd arrrues may be able to
foreclosc the possibrlrty of a hghtrung ncton' for
anl' adl'crsanes u'ho mrght attack them, thev do not
constifute an adequate drssuasrve force rr the long
term The three govemments therefore lrish to
establish close ties urth nerghbounng countnes such
as Poland and the formatron of a Lrthuaman-Pohsh
peacekeepurg umt rs the expressron of onll' one
example in this connectron. To that end. mcreased
coopcration with other countries of the reglon,
u'hethcr thcy are NATO members or takc a neutral
stanc€. u'ould be possrble and even desrrable In
thrs connectton, lt ls u'orth mentromng the
agrecment on trarmng given to the Baltic battalion
bv Bntish and Scandrnavran instructors. and, more
generallr'. the eistencc of the Councrl of the Baltrc
Sea States. w'hrch rvas set up ur 1992.
ll4 Thc Baltrc states' accessron to NATO rs
defimtelv ther pnme ob.;ectrve in the secunh' field.
All three governments are convrrced that mem-
bershrp of the Atlantrc Alhance is the onlv vehrcle
that can fumrsh them urth a drssuasive element and
enhancc thcr stabrhn', both of uluch are
rn&spensable for marntarmng a balancc m ther
socretres and for therr econorruc and socnl
dclelopment
I 15. Under the present crrcumstances, hou'ever. rt
has bcrcn made clear that the three Baltrc states gill
not bclong to the first group of central and eastem
European countnes to accede to NATO. In thrs
fiameu-ork. it rs rvorth mentrorung that the Pnme
Mrruster of Furland. Paavo Lrpponen. has rulcd out
suggestrons vorced rn Europe in recent months that
the issue of the Baltrc states should be solved
through the creatron of a rcgional secuntv zone led
b1' Fmland and Srveden:4.
116. Auare of thcse consrderations, and even
though thel' have not grven up their NATO
asprations. thc Baltic states are no\\'arrung at earll'
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membership of the European Uruon and Westem
European Uruon Thel' recentll' stepped up the
considerable efforts they have been makrng for
some vears to restruclure their econonues and have
clearly stated that thel' hope to become members of
the European Union in 2001 There s no doubt that
the entry of the three Baltic states to the European
Uruon and their accession to WEU would
strengthen their secuntl-positron on the rntemational
stage especially as they rvould srmultaneously'
contuue urth their consistent efforts to rmprove
relatrons wth their nerghbours and further their
tnlateral cooperation on secunty and defence.
ll7. One remarung obstacle on the road to early
memberslup of WEU rs the policy of WEU member
states, accordmg to which full membership of WEU
can only be granted to those states u'hrch are both
members of the EU and NATO Tlus poko'.
combured urth the vanous secunty and defence
policies of a number of European states, has nou'
led to anomalies preventrng the establishment of a
European secunq' architecture whrch takes account
of pecuhanties and posrtrons resulturg from
Europe's eventfu I hrstory
118 At present, there are several EU member
states that do not uish to jour NATO because they
do not lrrsh to join a milrtary allianc€ ln contrast,
some of the candrdates for EU membership, such as
the Baltrc states, are also askrng for admrttance to
NATO, rvhrch is not hkely,to be granted m the near
future.
I 19 In order to enable more rmaguratrve solutions
for secunty arrangements urvolvrrg European non-
NATO mernber states. such as some Scandrnal,ran
countnes and the Baltic states, to be found, the
possibilrty should be examrned of abandonurg the
pnncrple of NATO memberstup as a condrtion for
grantlng WEU membership.25 In thrs frameu'ork, it
is unportant to accommodate the United States' fear
tlut it rvill be draun urto European collective
defencc commitnents ovcr u'hrch rt has no
mfluence. Disconnectrng NATO and WEU mem-
bership would pave the way for more complete
European integration r,lrthout anoma}es because of
the different levels of participatron m the EU and
WEU, and would also exclude an rrdrrect US veto
on WEU membership.
25 See also Willem van Eekelen in Defense lt'ev,s,
19-25 August 1996.
120. The decrsrons taken ur Berln ur June 1996 to
develop a European secunry' and defence rdentrty
urtlun the Alliancc, takng full advantage of the
approved CJTF concept, do not present an obstacle.
On the contrar)', thev rvould seem to be very helpful
for makrng unagrrative solutrons more effectivc.
l2l Under the present circumstances. it will
certaurly be drfficult to prevent the Baltrc states
recerr.rng the rmprcssion that thel'have been left tn a
"grey area" by thc West follourng the first u,ave of
NATO enlargement. kutntrves thcrefore need to be
taken m the short term to consohdate the foehng of
secunty ur these countnes and grve them an
assuranc€ that they arc accepted as partners, if not
allies, b1' the rest of Europe and the West as a
whole. Tlus could grve rise to an rmproved milrtary
cooperation procedure ur the region, wfuch 
- 
,rmong
othcr thrngs 
- 
would make pror,rsion for regular
consultatrons betll'een headquarters, the organis-
ation of manoeuwes and cooperation on tra:mng (as
is already the case for the trauring of officers and
NCOs of the three countnes by British and
Scandinar.ran rnstructors). WEU would be per-
fectly capable of takrng irutiatives to that end.
122. In ttus context, it should be mentroned that
dunng a recent Defence Commrttee rasrt to Borur
and Rostock. the German naw made rt clcar that it
consrders the Baltrc Sea as an area particularlv
suited for cooperation and parbrersh,p. It has been
actively rnvolved in goodrull r,rsrts and human-
itanan ard and rt consrders the bilateral and
multrlateral exercises wrth Parnrership for Peace
countries to be an rnportant contnbution to stabrh[,
rr the region Due to the fact that the German naly
caffiot accommodate all the desires and requests for
cooperation, it has now decrded resolutelv to
support the enhancement of cooperatron wrthrn the
Baltic region and to focus avarlable resources on the
naues of Poland. Estonia. Latvra and Lrthuarua As
part of Germany's specral bilateral programmes, the
German nav)' proudes matenal support, has
cstablished adrrrsory groups and rs conductrrg
trarmng or exercise actiraties covenng all aspecm of
mrlrtary affarrs.
123. Germanl, has also proposed developurg,
under the auspices of the OSCE, a regional
structure for confidence- and securit_v-buildrng
measures (CSBMs) in the Baltic Sea area. Such
CSBMs, u'luch should conform to the pror.rsrons of
the CFE Trealv and the recent Vierura document,
could makc a specrfic contnbutron to secunt_v in the
Baltic Sea area.
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124. In an earher report on "Securitv and mrhtary
cooperatron rr the Baltic Sea area", a number of
practrcal recommendations rverc made, among them
the estabhshment of a "Standrng Baltrc Sea Force"
urth Denmark. Estorua. Germanv, LaMa.
Lrthuama and Poland as foundrng mcmbers. lrith
the prornso that at a later stage. othcr Baltrc Sea
countnes should be able to Jorl. The tasks of tlus
force should mclude border control, morutonng of
fishrng and emronmental regulatrons. shrpputg
control. search and rescue, and m due course the
rmplementatron of Petersberg mrssions In the light
of the prescnt drscusston on the enlargement of
NATO. u'hrch uill apparentll'be lrruted to a ferv
corurtnes and urll certarnlv not utclude the Baluc
states. the proposals made m Assembly Recom-
mcndatron 585 have become even more pertinent. It
is uidel1' recogrused that rvestem European coun-
tnes, and WEU too, must make a serious effort to
meet the secunh' demands of the Baltic states,
u'luch are onl1'too u'ell-knorrn and understandable
These efforts caffrot be confined to drawrng up
consultatron procedures and holdrng half-1'earl1' top-
level meetrngs. Cooperatron among the armed
forces rn such fields as planning and exercises s
vital Mantrme force cooperatron comes naturall1'
rn the Baltrc Sea regron and can rn no u'a1' be
rnterpretcd as an offensive actrvrtl' WEU. in u'hrch
the Baltrc states paficrpate as assoctate partners, ts
the logrcal framework for such cooperation
(d) Poland
125 Proud of rts recent achrevements, partrcularll'
as regards the econom\', a\\are of the
precanousness of geopolrtical balances m the regton
and reassured as to the West's polrtrcal resolve to
include it rn the nelv polrtrcal and secuntv structures
of westem Europc (an expanded NATO. EU and
WE[I), Poland rs nonethelcss rcalstrc both about its
oun objectrves and the methods rt rntends to emplol'
to garn admrttance to $estem structures
126 In tus address to thc Royal Institute of
lnternational Affars (Chatham House, London) on
24 October, Presrdent Krvasrueuskr clearly ruled
out any idea of statromng nuclear \ €apons on
Pohsh temtory and stressed that NATO's forth-
commg enlargement rvould have to be accomparued
by a charter govemmg Russra's relations with the
Atlantic Alliance and b1' a secunty agreement
betu'een NATO and Ukrarre Eastem Europe's
secunq'archrtecture would have to be complemen-
ted b1' a r,rrdcr cooperatron prograrnme than the
current Partnershp for Peace. to take in those
countnes of the regron not rrcluded in the first rvave
ofNATO enlargement.
127 Poland's concem to rmpror,e relattons lrrth rts
nerghbours and the secunt_l' chmate in the regton,
along urth rts efforts toJorl w'hat are purelv westem
structures. have been a characteristrc fcature of the
countn/s forergrr pohcy snce the collapse of
commuilsm and, above all, rllustrate the current
govemment's intematronal strategv. The sharp
rmprovement in the economrc situation, bome out
by' a strong ups\mg rr production, clearll' bolsters
confidence among Poland's leaders and is helprng to
restructure the economv. a process that ts
rndrspensablc rf the countr), s to 
.;our the European
Uruon and take on the financial burden that uTll
result from its forthcomrng mcorporatron ur Euro-
Atlantic structures. The country's poltttcal r"rll to
contnbute to the costs of nerv strucfures has been
clearly stated throughout the Pohsh tuerarchr', the
most recent occasion berng the Prestdent's address
m l,ondon Plans to procure 100 combat aircraft
rrrth a vierv to modemrsmg the ar force are part of
these efforts.
128 Poland rs very activc ut the field of regional
cooperatron, rvtuch is one of the prllars of its
secunty policy. It rs strll a member of the Visegard
Group. uhich can perhaps be sard to have been the
most mpor[ant regonal movement rn central and
eastem Europe follourng the collapse of com-
munrsm The fact that it has opened up its foreign
and secunty' pohcy to the Baltrc states is equally
remarkable especrally as it rs becomrng rncreasrngll'
clear that, at least to begrn with, NATO ri,rll not
assune responsrbrhq' for the secunty of thrs regron
and thrs is partrcularlv true m the case of Estorua,
Lah.ra and Lithuama. More specrficalll'. Poland
has estabhshed rlhat can almost be descnbed as
specral relatrons urth Lrthuania, urth thc signature
of the 1993 brlateral agreement whrch, among other
tlungs. made prolrsron for mrlrtarl'cooperatron and
led to the creatron of a Polish-Lithuaman
peacekeepurg urut The decisron taken at thc Baltrc
Sea commercral and mdustnal summrt (Stockholm,
Apnl 1996) to create a free-trade zone betu'een the
Baltrc Sca countnes and Poland rs a further
example of Pohsh polio'.
129. The adoptron of confidence- and secunty-
buildmg measures (CSBMs) rr the region is also
one of the mam features of Poland's regional policy.
The list of CSBMs draun up b]' Poland thus
prolrdes not only for rncreased naval cooperatron
(accrdent prevention, pnor notifi cation of exercises,
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mutatlons to observers and jornt training) but also
for the wrthdrawal of nuclear weapons from the
region, together with chemrcal rveapons abandoned
at the bottom of the Baltic Sea. It also addresses the
problem of evacuatrng nuclear waste
130. Poland's regional pohcy. the declarcd oblec-
tive of u'hrch rs to promote secunt_v rn central and
eastem Europe and ur the Baltic Sea region, mrght
also pror,rde the country with the means to assert
itself as a medrum-szed power, albeit, but
neveftheless one of caprtal rmportance for tlus part
of the world The creation of a Pohsh-Ukraurian
peacekeeprng batLalion, the tnpartite cooperation
agreement sr$ed wrth (krarne and the United
Krngdom on milrtary trauung and the orgarusation
of manoeuwes (the first exercise took place rn
Poland rn September rn the presenc€ of three
natronal defonce mrnisters and rnith the particrpation
of 4 500 men) and agreements concluded u,rth
Germany (1993) and Denmark are alL examples of
Poland's classic drplomatrc approach and pomt to
innovatron rn the uutiatrves makrng up the regional
drmension of rts forergn policy.
l3l. It was noted earher rn tlls rcport that the
German naly has decrded to concentrate its
cooperation efforts rn the Baltrc Sea area on the
Polish navy'and the navies of the Baltrc states
132 In August 1996, the German fast patrol boat
flotrlla based in Wamemtrndc and the 8th Polish
coastal defence flotilla based rl Swrnemunde
estabhshed an official parherslup. Both parhrers
have norv agreed on a cooperalon programme, to
be approved by tughcr authonties, which covers
staff talks, usrts, exchanges of officers and manl'
other actrr,riles The Defencc Mirusters of Den-
mark, Germany and Poland have norv agreed to
wrden tlus parbrership bl,rrtegratrng a Darush unrt.
WI. Conclusions
133. The dust throun up bv the great changes and
upheavals rn central and eastem Europe is gradually
settling and the states of the region. uhether newly-
independent or liberated from the humrliatrng bonds
of the monolitluc polrtical culture of communism,
are trying to find or redrscover ther place rn what
has become a drfferent Europe. So many important
changes have taken place that the rvestem European
states and therr Umted States allies have also been
obliged to redefine therr policies and alliances.
After some earlv and someuhat rather paruc-
stncken irutntrves such as NATO's No(h Atlantic
Cooperatron Council. u'luch were not ahvavs of
much use but understandable from a lustorical
perspectivc, it was very quickly realised that more
senous uritralves were required. The Rome summit
of NATO ur l99l and WEU's Petersberg Declar-
atron m 1992 heralded a new era of task redefirutron
and the rrtemal transformation of both secunlv
orgarusations Gradualll,, it lvas adnutted by some
and recogrused by others that ln the new
crrcumstances. the Amencans u'anted feuer
obligations and the Europeans wanted more
responsibilities rn Europe's secunty and defence
Especralh' rn the begrnmng, this drscussion over a
stuft ur responsrbiltres was pamful Hintrng at
Amencan drsengagement was lese-majestl,. to be
purushed severelv. and talk about the estabhshment
of a European securiq, and defence identrty rvas
ludrcrous Euro-ideahsm, arrogance and a drsgrace-
ful slap rr the face of the nation whrch had hberated
Europe from fascist rule.
134. The debate on responsrbilrtres rn the Alliance
is not over 1et, but thc earlier surrealistic phase has
fortunately been replaced bv a more realistrc and
down-torarth phase in rvhich each participant can
vorce tus oprnion urthout berrg ndrculed rn a
kangaroo coufi. The conflict in Bosrua was an
mportant catalvst for changrng the tone of the
debate.
135 NATO's Brussels summt of January 1994
launched the combrred loint task force concept, the
idea berng to make collective assets and capabilities
of the Alhance avarlable for WEUJed operatrons.
The drscussions over rmplemcntation of tlus conccpt
dragged on unsuccessfully' for hl'o 1'ears untrl, rr
Deccmber 1995. France decided to reoccupf its seat
rn NATO's Militarl'Committee ivtlle promrsrng to
participate even more full1' rf certam condrtrons,
such as a thorough transformatron of NATO's
command structures and a Europeamsation of
NATO, u'ere fulfilled An rmportant reason for
France was that if Europe's securitv and defcnce
rdentrtv could not be created urthout NATO, it
should be done rvithin it. The rntensified drscus-
srons wrthm NATO, u'hcre sacred cows \\€re no
longer a taboo, led to the North Atlanhc Councrl
dectsions rn Berlur, rrhich, if successfully rmple-
mented, may become an rmporLant tumrng point in
the Alliance's and Europe's secunty and defence
policl'
136. Directivcs rvere issued for a further thorough
review of NATO's mrlitary command structure, for
the rmplementation of the CJTF concept and for the
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development of the European secunh and defence
rdentrty.
137 Although there rs agre€ment over the
pnncrples of these closell' rclated issues, rt urll not
be easy to put them mto practrce. It is essential that
the adaptation of NATO's command structures
should grve the Europeans pcrmanent and vrsible
representation at the highest levcls. together wrth a
possrbrlrry' for them to mount ther olrn operatlons.
usrrg Alhed assets rf the alhes agree. The
drscussron of thesc rssues is not )'et closed and it
uould be a mrracle if solutrons to all these com-
phcated rssues \\'ere found before the next North
Atlantrc Councrl meetrng rn December 1996.
138. A ma;or point in the drscussions concems the
occupancv of command posts. The Uruted States
nou' holds the two ma;or posts rr each of NATO's
strategrc commands, SACLANT and SACEUR.
Francc has ursisted that the next t$'o major posts.
the southem and northem commands rn Europe.
should rotate among the European alhes. At the
moment. the debatc rs conccntratcd on AFSOUTH,
u'hrch France rvants to be a European command. It
should be noted that the Urutcd States msrsts that rt
urll not give up AFSOUTH because of the presence
of rts 6th flcet under this command It should,
houever. be noted that rn fact the 6th fleet rs
exclusrvelv dependent on the Uruted States natronal
command charn. ofu'luchthe Amencan AFSOUTH
commander rs also part, m addrtron to holding tus
NATO post
139 Remarkablv enough ur tlus stand-off behveen
France and the Uruted States. the European alhes
have not srded uith the United Statcs and therr
posrtion vanes from support for the French uew to
neutrahr'. Thrs rs a clear rndrcatron of changed
attrtudes urthm the Alhance
140. Enlargcment. or hou' to provrde more
stabrlrtl and secunf'for central and eastem Europe
is the other rmportant drscussion m progress.
Although no countnes have officralh'bcen named, it
has become qurte clear that NATO rs armrng at
enlargement, supposedly b1' 1999, urth a liruted
number of countncs NATO has repeatedly stated
that its enlargement should not create nerv drusrons
rn Europe but it can be argued that a firs lrruted
wave of enlargement uill give more secuntv to
those ccntral European countries u'ho need it least
and will create more rnstabilitl' and insecunq' for
those rvhrch are alreadl'at most nsk
l4l Even if there are now more mrsgrvings
because of uhat nught be some negatrve
consequences ofearlv and partial enlargement. stop-
pmg or postpomng the process rs no longer an
optron. Under the present circumsiances. tlus would
senously'damage the credrbrlrt_v of NATO and thosc
member states that have declared themselves firm
advocates of enlargement
142. It rs also to be noted that the central and
eastem European candrdates for membershrp are
reachrng out for polrtical, ps1'chological and mrlrtarl'
reassurance utule Russia is tnlng to shape rts nerv
role and rdenti['. NATO and its member states
have no choice other than to be responsrve to their
concems. Even though some of those countncs are
not 1'et ehgrble for membershrp, scnous effors
should be madc by the Alliance and its member
states to prorade ma,xrmum comfort ur the form of
cooperation and consultation. There is also an
rmportant rolc here for WEU lvhrch should
reconsider the possrbilrtv of abandonmg NATO
membershrp as a condrtron for WEU membershrp rn
order to produce more rnagrntrve solutions for
secunt,' arrangements invohrng European non-
NATO member statcs.
143 Furalll'. rt cannot be cmphasised strongll'
enough that good relations betu'een NATO and
Russra are of paramount rmpor[ance for stabilrtl'
and secuntv ur Europe There is no doubt that
Russn cannot cxerclse a veto on NATO enlarge-
ment or on the secunt)' ambitions of central and
eastem European countnes. but t u,ould be
extremell' unr\rse for the Atlantic Alliance to go
ahead urthout hanng reached an appropnate
agreement on ts relatrons urth Russra. Nobodl'can
denl'that Russn rs an rmportant plar-er rn the ficld
of European secuntl' and rt s no secret that
concems over stabrlrtv rr Russn are the marn
reason uh1'central and eastem European countnes
are askmg forNATO memberslup
144 Here too. WEU, as an uruquelv European
defence orgarusation urth a less emotronalll,
charged hrstory than NATO, can play a role rr
resummg the dralogue uith Russia
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